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Slapping Criminal Speech:  
How Evolution of the 




Orlando J. Villalba* 
The free communication of ideas and opinions is one of the most 
precious of the rights of man.  Every citizen may, accordingly, speak, 
write, and print with freedom, but shall be responsible for such abuses 
of this freedom as shall be defined by law.1 
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INTRODUCTION 
For hundreds of years, democracy proponents have 
emphasized the need to protect speech.  Indeed, many of our 
country’s earliest leaders believed protecting speech was so 
important that they made freedom of speech the first of all of our 
fundamental rights secured within the Bill of Rights (and likely 
would not have approved of the Constitution but for the general 
understanding that a Bill of Rights would be adopted 
immediately after ratification).2  And while the limits of free 
speech have been tested on numerous occasions in our nation’s 
history, it remains among our most cherished freedoms. 
In 1992, California, like many other states, affirmed the 
importance of protecting speech when it adopted legislation 
 
 2 Hugo L. Black, The Bill of Rights, 35 N.Y.U. L. REV. 865, 869 (1960). 
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aimed at curbing so-called “SLAPP” lawsuits.3  SLAPPs 
(“strategic lawsuits against public participation”) are meritless 
lawsuits filed for the purpose of repressing free speech and 
petitioning rights.4  California’s anti-SLAPP legislation sought to 
provide SLAPP defendants, who were essentially being sued for 
exercising their free speech rights, a means by which to achieve 
early termination of lawsuits against them.5  Anti-SLAPP 
legislation was initially seen as a great victory for free speech. 
But free speech is not always so pleasant and appealing and, 
perhaps more importantly, does not always render itself so 
attractive to our protective senses.  Inevitably, uncomfortable 
scenarios cause us to question the extent of permissible speech.  
What should we do when somebody burns our flag?  Or, when 
somebody speaks in discriminatory tones?  Or, when somebody’s 
speech borders on (or even crosses the line of) illegality?  It is this 
last question which seems to have posed particular difficulty for 
California courts of late, especially as such courts have been 
called upon ever more frequently to interpret the extent of 
protection provided by anti-SLAPP legislation. 
The instant article addresses what has become known in 
California as the illegality exception to the anti-SLAPP statute: a 
court-created carve-out to the anti-SLAPP statute which exempts 
illegal speech from the statute’s protections.  Part I of this article 
provides a brief background to California’s anti-SLAPP law, 
reviewing its historical underpinnings as well as its procedural 
mechanics.  Part II details the development and evolution of the 
illegality exception, with particular attention to the conflicting 
and sometimes unpredictable use of illegality (and, in more 
recent times, criminality) as a means to determine application of 
the exception.  Finally, Part III of this article diagnoses the 
present and future application of the illegality exception and 
offers ideas for remediation of the most concerning contradictions 
in the application of the doctrine.   
I.  AN OVERVIEW OF CALIFORNIA’S ANTI-SLAPP LAW 
A. Historical Development 
According to sociologists, the term SLAPP litigation refers to 
“civil lawsuits that are aimed at preventing citizens from 
exercising their political rights or punishing those who have done 
 
 3 Dixon v. Superior Court, 36 Cal. Rptr. 2d 687, 693–94 (Ct. App. 1994).  
 4 GEORGE W. PRING & PENELOPE CANAN, SLAPPS: GETTING SUED FOR SPEAKING 
OUT 1–3 (1996). 
 5 See, e.g., Sipple v. Found. for Nat’l Progress, 83 Cal. Rptr. 2d 677, 682 (Ct. App. 
1999). 
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so.”6  SLAPP suits are “brought to obtain an economic advantage 
over the defendant, not to vindicate a legally cognizable right of 
the plaintiff.”7  Indeed, the motivation of the SLAPP plaintiff is 
not to win his or her lawsuit; instead, the plaintiff’s true desire is 
to cause “delay and distraction . . . and to punish activists by 
imposing litigation costs on them for exercising their 
constitutional right to speak and petition the government for 
redress of grievances.”8  An oft-referred to example of a 
prototypical SLAPP suit is one “filed by a well-heeled land 
developer trying to silence a neighborhood organization that 
protests the developer’s plans.”9  Additional examples of SLAPP 
suits typically involve alleged causes of action for “defamation, 
various business torts such as interference with prospective 
economic advantage, nuisance, and intentional infliction of 
emotional distress.”10 
In 1992, the California Legislature responded to the 
escalating numbers of SLAPP suits by enacting section 425.16 of 
the California Civil Procedure Code (commonly referred to as the 
anti-SLAPP statute).11  In adopting the anti-SLAPP statute, the 
Legislature observed: 
[T]here has been a disturbing increase in lawsuits brought primarily 
to chill the valid exercise of the constitutional rights of freedom of 
speech and petition for the redress of grievances.  The Legislature 
finds and declares that it is in the public interest to encourage 
continued participation in matters of public significance, and that this 
participation should not be chilled through abuse of the judicial 
process.12 
Because otherwise meritless SLAPP suits seek to deplete 
“‘the defendant’s energy’ and drain ‘his or her resources’ . . . the 
Legislature sought ‘to prevent SLAPPs by ending them early and 
without great cost to the SLAPP target.’”13   
With the enactment of the anti-SLAPP statute, SLAPP 
defendants were empowered with the ability to file a new type of 
 
 6 Wilcox v. Superior Court, 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d 446, 449 (Ct. App. 1994) (quoting 
Penelope Canan & George W. Pring, Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation, 35 
SOC. PROBS. 506, 506 (1988)), overruled by Equilon Enters. v. Consumer Cause, Inc., 52 
P.3d 685, 694 n.5 (Cal. 2002). 
 7 Wilcox, 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 450. 
 8 Dixon, 36 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 693. 
 9 Visher v. City of Malibu, 23 Cal. Rptr. 3d 816, 819 (Ct. App. 2005). 
 10 Wilcox, 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 449. 
 11 Dixon, 36 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 693.  
 12 CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16(a) (West 2011). 
 13 Varian Med. Sys., Inc. v. Delfino, 106 P.3d 958, 966 (Cal. 2005) (quoting Simmons 
v. Allstate Ins. Co., 112 Cal. Rptr. 2d 397, 401 (Ct. App. 2001); Equilon Enters. v. 
Consumer Cause, 52 P.3d 685, 692–93 (Cal. 2002)). 
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“special motion to strike.”14  More specifically, subsection (b) of 
the statute provides that:  
[a] cause of action against a person arising from any act of that person 
in furtherance of the person’s right of petition or free speech under the 
United States or the California Constitution in connection with a 
public issue shall be subject to a special motion to strike, unless the 
court determines that the plaintiff has established that there is a 
probability that the plaintiff will prevail on the claim.15 
In enacting the anti-SLAPP statute, the Legislature 
identified four categories of “acts” which are protected by the 
statute, and thus subject to the special motion to strike: 
(1) any written or oral statement or writing made before a legislative, 
executive, or judicial proceeding, or any other official proceeding 
authorized by law,  
(2) any written or oral statement or writing made in connection with 
an issue under consideration or review by a legislative, executive, or 
judicial body, or any other official proceeding authorized by law,  
(3) any written or oral statement or writing made in a place open to 
the public or a public forum in connection with an issue of public 
interest, or  
(4) any other conduct in furtherance of the exercise of the 
constitutional right of petition or the constitutional right of free 
speech in connection with a public issue or an issue of public 
interest.16 
Aside from the above general categories of protected acts, the 
Legislature did not limit application of the provision to any 
specific types of actions, “recognizing that all kinds of claims 
could achieve the objective of a SLAPP suit—to interfere with 
and burden the defendant’s exercise of his or her rights.”17  
Indeed, “[n]othing in the statute itself categorically excludes any 
particular type of action from its operation.”18  As a result, the 
anti-SLAPP statute has been found applicable to a wide range of 
actions, including breach of contract and fraud claims,19 
defamation claims,20 malicious prosecution claims,21 abuse of 
process claims,22 and even petitions for injunctive relief.23 
 
 14 CIV. PROC. § 425.16(b)(1). 
 15 Id. 
 16 Id. at § 425.16(e). 
 17 Church of Scientology of Cal. v. Wollersheim, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d 620, 634 (Ct. App. 
1996). 
 18 Navellier v. Sletten, 52 P.3d 703, 711 (Cal. 2002). 
 19 See, e.g., id. at 713; Midland Pac. Bldg. Corp. v. King, 68 Cal. Rptr. 3d 499, 501 
(Ct. App. 2007); Philipson & Simon v. Gulsvig, 64 Cal. Rptr. 3d 504, 507 (Ct. App. 2007). 
 20 See, e.g., Nygard, Inc. v. Uusi-Kerttula, 72 Cal. Rptr. 3d 210, 213 (Ct. App. 2008); 
Gilbert v. Sykes, 53 Cal. Rptr. 3d 752, 757 (Ct. App. 2007); McGarry v. Univ. of San Diego, 
64 Cal. Rptr. 3d 467, 488 (Ct. App. 2007); Computerxpress, Inc. v. Jackson, 113 Cal. Rptr. 
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B. Procedural Mechanics 
The anti-SLAPP statute seeks to protect SLAPP defendants 
by providing them a procedure to obtain early dismissal of 
meritless claims and insulating them from the costs and 
intrusions of discovery prior to dismissal.24  This aim is 
accomplished through several mechanisms provided in the 
statute.25 
Initially, the statute limits discovery once a special motion to 
strike is filed, providing that “[a]ll discovery proceedings in the 
action shall be stayed upon the filing of a notice of motion made 
pursuant to this section.”26  This discovery stay generally 
remains in effect until the court rules on the defendant’s special 
motion to strike.27  A plaintiff can move for relief from this stay 
in order to conduct limited and specified discovery, but whether 
such relief is allowed is subject to the trial court’s finding of good 
cause.28 
As for the procedure of the motion itself, a special motion to 
strike allows the trial court to “evaluate[] the merits of the 
lawsuit using a summary judgment-like procedure at an early 
stage of the litigation.”29  To encourage this early resolution, the 
statute allows a defendant to bring its special motion to strike 
“within 60 days of the service of the complaint or, in the court’s 
discretion, at any later time upon terms it deems proper.”30  Oral 
argument on the motion “shall be scheduled by the clerk of the 
court for a hearing not more than 30 days after the service of the 
motion unless the docket conditions of the court require a later 
hearing.”31 
 
2d 625, 632, 649 (Ct. App. 2001); Sipple v. Found. for Nat’l Progress, 83 Cal. Rptr. 2d 677, 
685 (Ct. App. 1999).  
 21 See, e.g., Jarrow Formulas, Inc. v. LaMarche, 74 P.3d 737, 739 (Cal. 2003); Daniels 
v. Robbins, 105 Cal. Rptr. 3d 683, 688 (Ct. App. 2010); Drummond v. Desmarais, 98 Cal. 
Rptr. 3d 183, 186–87 (Ct. App. 2009); Sycamore Ridge Apartments, LLC v. Naumann, 69 
Cal. Rptr. 3d 561, 567 (Ct. App. 2007). 
 22 See, e.g., Booker v. Rountree, 66 Cal. Rptr. 3d 733, 735 (Ct. App. 2007); Ramona 
Unified Sch. Dist. v. Tsiknas, 37 Cal. Rptr. 3d 381, 384 (Ct. App. 2005).   
 23 See, e.g., City of L.A. v. Animal Def. League, 37 Cal. Rptr. 3d 632, 635 (Ct. App. 
2006); Thomas v. Quintero, 24 Cal. Rptr. 3d 619, 621 (Ct. App. 2005); Bernardo v. 
Planned Parenthood Fed’n of Am., 9 Cal. Rptr. 3d 197, 203 (Ct. App. 2004).  
 24 See, e.g., Sipple, 83 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 682. 
 25 Id. 
 26 CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16(g) (West 2011). 
 27 Id. 
 28 Id. 
 29 Varian Med. Sys., Inc. v. Delfino, 106 P.3d 958, 966 (Cal. 2005).  
 30 CIV. PROC. § 425.16(f). 
 31 Id. 
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In determining whether to strike a claim under the anti-
SLAPP statute, the court engages in a two-step analysis.32  In the 
first step, “the court decides whether the defendant has made a 
threshold showing that the challenged cause of action is one 
arising from protected activity.”33  “A defendant meets this 
burden by demonstrating that the act underlying the plaintiff’s 
cause fits one of the categories spelled out in [section 425.16] 
subdivision (e).”34  If the court finds that defendant has made a 
satisfactory showing on the first step, the court then must 
determine “whether the plaintiff has demonstrated a probability 
of prevailing on the claim.”35  “Only a cause of action that 
satisfies both prongs of the anti-SLAPP statute—i.e., that arises 
from protected speech or petitioning and lacks even minimal 
merit—is a SLAPP, subject to being stricken under the statute.”36 
In considering the defendant’s burden on the first prong, it is 
important to recognize that “[s]ection 425.16 applies to a cause of 
action arising from an act in furtherance of a person’s right of 
petition or free speech under the United States or California 
Constitution in connection with a public issue.”37  Therefore, the 
most important consideration in the first prong analysis “is 
whether the cause of action is based on the defendant’s protected 
free speech or petitioning activity.”38  
Moreover, the “definitional focus” of this inquiry “is not the 
form of the plaintiff’s cause of action but, rather, the defendant’s 
activity that gives rise to his or her asserted liability—and 
whether that activity constitutes protected speech or 
petitioning.”39  As such, an anti-SLAPP defendant need not 
necessarily establish its actions are constitutionally protected 
under the First Amendment as a matter of law.40  Rather, the 
 
 32 See Navellier v. Sletten, 52 P.3d 703, 708 (Cal. 2002); Equilon Enters. v. 
Consumer Cause, Inc., 52 P.3d 685, 694 (Cal. 2002); Ramona Unified Sch. Dist. v. 
Tsiknas, 37 Cal. Rptr. 3d 381, 387 (Ct. App. 2005). 
 33 Navellier, 52 P.3d at 708; Equilon, 52 P.3d at 694. 
 34 Navellier, 52 P.3d at 708; Braun v. Chronicle Publ’g Co., 61 Cal. Rptr. 2d 58, 61 
(Ct. App. 1997).  
 35 Navellier, 52 P.3d at 708; Equilon, 52 P.3d at 694.  See also Computerxpress, Inc. 
v. Jackson, 113 Cal. Rptr. 2d 625, 632 (Ct. App. 2001) (“[T]he burden shifts to the plaintiff 
to establish a probability of prevailing, by making a prima facie showing of facts which 
would, if proved, support a judgment in plaintiff’s favor.”). 
 36 Navellier, 52 P.3d at 708. 
 37 Governor Gray Davis Comm. v. Am. Taxpayers Alliance, 125 Cal. Rptr. 2d 534, 
540 (Ct. App. 2002). 
 38 Navellier, 52 P.3d at 709. 
 39 Id. at 711.  See also Church of Scientology of Cal. v. Wollersheim, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d 
620, 634 (Ct. App. 1996). 
 40 Wilcox v. Superior Court, 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d 446, 449 (Ct. App. 1994).  See also Oasis 
W. Realty, LLC v. Goldman, 250 P.3d 1115, 1126 (Cal. 2011); Navellier, 52 P.3d at 713; 
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statute merely requires a defendant to make “a prima facie 
showing [that] the plaintiff’s suit arises ‘from any act of 
[defendant] in furtherance of [defendant’s] right of petition or 
free speech under the United States or California Constitution in 
connection with a public issue.’”41  And, in determining whether 
this showing has been made, a court should emphasize substance 
over form; it is the “principal thrust or gravamen of a cause of 
action [that] determines whether the anti-SLAPP statute 
applies.”42  Indeed, “[t]he anti-SLAPP statute does not apply 
where protected activity is only collateral or incidental to the 
purpose of the transaction or occurrence underlying the 
complaint.”43  
As noted, “the Legislature did not intend that in order to 
invoke the special motion to strike the defendant must first 
establish [that his or] her actions are constitutionally protected 
under the First Amendment as a matter of law.”44   
Instead, under the statutory scheme, a court must generally presume 
the validity of the claimed constitutional right in the first step of the 
anti-SLAPP analysis, and then permit the parties to address the issue 
in the second step of the analysis, if necessary. . . .  Otherwise, the 
second step would become superfluous in almost every case, resulting 
in an improper shifting of the burdens.45 
Thus, where a defendant meets his burden as to the first 
prong, the court then proceeds to evaluate the plaintiff’s burden 
on the second prong.46  In this phase of the analysis, “the trial 
court must consider facts so as to make a determination whether 
plaintiffs can establish a prima facie probability of prevailing on 
their claims.”47  Though the court does not weigh the evidence 
 
Fox Searchlight Pictures, Inc. v. Paladino, 106 Cal. Rptr. 2d 906, 916 (Ct. App. 2001). 
 41 Wilcox, 33 Cal. Rptr. at 452 (quoting CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16(b) (West 
2011) (second and third alterations in original).  See also Paul for Council v. Hanyecz, 102 
Cal. Rptr. 2d 864, 870 (Ct. App. 2001), Equilon Enters. v. Consumer Cause, Inc., 52 P.3d 
685, 694 n.5 (Cal. 2002); Wollersheim, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 630.  
 42 Cal. Back Specialists Med. Grp. v. Rand, 73 Cal. Rptr. 3d 268, 272 (Ct. App. 2008).  
See also Wang v. Wal-Mart Real Estate Bus. Trust, 63 Cal. Rptr. 3d 575, 585 (Ct. App. 
2007); Ramona Unified Sch. Dist. v. Tsiknas, 37 Cal. Rptr. 3d 381, 388 (Ct. App. 2005); 
Martinez v. Metabolife Int’l, Inc., 6 Cal. Rptr. 3d 494, 499 (Ct. App. 2003). 
 43 Rand, 73 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 272.  See also Baharian-Mehr v. Smith, 117 Cal. Rptr. 
3d 153, 159 (Ct. App. 2010); Wang, 63 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 585;; Scott v. Metabolife Int’l, Inc., 9 
Cal. Rptr. 3d 242, 249 (Ct. App. 2004);; Martinez v. Metabolife Int’l, Inc., 6 Cal. Rptr. 3d 
494, 499 (Ct. App. 2003). 
 44 Paladino, 106 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 916. 
 45 Chavez v. Mendoza, 114 Cal. Rptr. 2d 825, 830 (Ct. App. 2001). 
 46 See Oasis W. Realty, LLC v. Goldman, 250 P.3d 1115, 1120 (Cal. 2011); Zamos v. 
Stroud, 87 P.3d 802, 806 (Cal. 2004); Navellier v. Sletten, 52 P.3d 703, 708 (Cal. 2002); 
Equilon Enters., 52 P.3d at 694. 
 47 Blanchard v. DIRECTV, Inc., 20 Cal. Rptr. 3d 385, 398 (Ct. App. 2004) (emphasis 
omitted). 
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presented, “it must determine whether plaintiffs have 
demonstrated evidence which, if credited, would justify their 
prevailing at trial.”48   
In determining whether the plaintiff has met her burden on 
the second prong, the court considers whether the plaintiff has 
“demonstrate[d] that the complaint is both legally sufficient and 
supported by a sufficient prima facie showing of facts to sustain a 
favorable judgment if the evidence submitted by the plaintiff is 
credited.”49  However, several cases have held that a plaintiff 
need only show that her case has “minimal merit” to meet this 
burden.50  Despite the statistical confusion this standard might 
create,51 upon such a showing of minimal merit, the defendant’s 
motion to strike will be denied and the case will proceed forward 
in litigation.52 
II.  EVOLUTION OF THE ILLEGALITY EXCEPTION 
While litigants pursuing and opposing anti-SLAPP motions 
must be prepared to address both prongs of the anti-SLAPP 
analysis, the remainder of this article, with a few exceptions, 
focuses primarily upon the first prong.  A compelling 
development has taken place over the past ten years with respect 
to how courts are applying the anti-SLAPP statute to speech and 
petitioning activity that straddles and sometimes crosses the 
lines of illegality.  California courts have lacked consistency in 
determining how much protection the anti-SLAPP statute should 
provide in these instances.   As shown below, while California 
courts initially applied a wide-ranging exclusion to these types of 
speech and activity, that exclusion appears to be retracting and 
taking on an air of uncertainty.   
 
 48 Id. (emphasis omitted). 
 49 Matson v. Dvorak, 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d 880, 886 (Ct. App. 1995). 
 50 See, e.g., Goldman, 250 P.3d at 1120; Soukup v. Law Offices of Herbert Hafif, 139 
P.3d 30, 51 (Cal. 2006); Jarrow Formulas, Inc. v. LaMarche, 74 P.3d 737, 745 (Cal. 2003); 
Navellier, 52 P.3d at 712. 
 51 It is true that few ever accuse attorneys of being mathematicians.  Judicial 
adoption of the “minimal merit” standard in anti-SLAPP cases might help explain why.  
After all, section 425.16(b)(1) provides that an action arising from one’s right to petition or 
exercise free speech will be stricken unless the plaintiff can establish “a probability” of 
prevailing on the claim in question. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16(b)(1) (West 2011).  
Merriam-Webster defines “probability” as “the quality or state of being probable,” and in 
turn, defines “probable” as both “supported by evidence strong enough to establish 
presumption but not proof” and “likely to be or become true or real.” ENCYCLOPEDIA 
BRITANNICA, MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 989 (Frederick C. Mish et al. 
eds., 11th ed. 2008).  Something that is probable (or, by extension, presumed or likely) 
would therefore seem to be of greater reliability than mere “minimal merit.” Id. 
 52 Soukup, 139 P.3d at 51; Jarrow Formulas, 74 P.3d at 745; Navellier, 52 P.3d at 
712. 
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A. The Birth of the Anti-SLAPP Statute’s Illegality Exception 
The first major development in the life of the anti-SLAPP 
statute’s illegality exception occurred in the California Court of 
Appeal’s 2001 decision Paul for Council v. Hanyecz.53  Paul 
involved a political action committee (the plaintiff), which had 
been formed to assist Paul Christiansen in his bid for reelection 
to the Laguna Niguel City Council.54  Defendants were three 
individuals, whom the plaintiff alleged had wrongfully interfered 
with Christiansen’s candidacy by influencing the election with 
illegal campaign contributions to Christiansen’s opponent.55  
Plaintiff’s complaint alleged that defendants’ actions amounted 
to a violation of the Political Reform Act of 1974.56 
In response to plaintiff’s complaint, defendants filed a special 
motion to strike under the anti-SLAPP statute.57  In their 
motion, defendants acknowledged that they did, in fact, engage 
in actions to subvert the political contribution rules.58  They did 
this by having certain family members make contributions to 
various candidates, then reimbursing their family members for 
such contributions.59  Thus, as the court considered the 
defendants’ anti-SLAPP motion, there was no dispute among the 
parties that defendants had violated the Political Reform Act.60 
Nonetheless, defendants claimed they were entitled to 
protection under the anti-SLAPP statute because their actions 
were done in furtherance of their political speech rights.61  More 
specifically, defendants claimed their money laundering was “in 
furtherance of their constitutional rights of free speech,” and 
arose “out of acts in furtherance of their constitutionally 
protected conduct.”62  The trial court agreed with defendants and 
granted their special motion to strike.63  Plaintiffs appealed, and 
the court of appeal framed the question on appeal as:  
[W]hether a defendant can properly claim that an action filed against 
it is a SLAPP suit for which it is entitled to section 425.16 protection, 
when its conduct involved actions which violate the law; or to put it 
 
 53 See Flatley, 139 P.3d at 12 (discussing Paul for Council v. Hanyecz, 102 Cal. Rptr. 
2d 864 (Ct. App. 2001)). 
 54 Paul, 102 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 867. 
 55 Id. 
 56 Id. 
 57 Id. 
 58 Id. 
 59 Id. 
 60 Id. at 871. 
 61 Id. at 867. 
 62 Id. 
 63 Id. at 868. 
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another way, can a defendant successfully assert that although the 
acts in which it engaged, and which are the subject of the plaintiff’s 
complaint, were illegal, they were done in furtherance of the 
constitutional rights of free speech or petition for redress of grievances 
in connection with a public issue and therefore the plaintiff is 
required, under section 425.16, to meet the predicate showing 
mandated by that statute?64 
The court of appeal answered this question by concluding 
that, “in such circumstances, defendants are not entitled to 
protection under section 425.16.”65  In reaching this result, the 
court considered this issue to exist solely within the context of 
the first prong, noting: “we need not address the second step of 
section 425.16’s two-step motion to strike process because we 
hold, as a matter of law, that defendants cannot meet their 
burden on the first step.”66   
In engaging in the first prong’s “arising from” analysis, the 
Paul court emphasized the policy of the statute in protecting the 
valid exercise of the constitutional rights of speech and petition.  
The court acknowledged defendants’ contention that their 
campaign money laundering activity was taken “in furtherance” 
of their constitutional right of free speech, and that “it is 
technically true that laundering campaign contributions is an act 
in furtherance of the giving of such contributions, that is, in 
furtherance of an act of free speech.”67  However, the court 
“reject[ed] the notion that section 425.16 exists to protect such 
illegal activity” as money laundering.68  As such, defendants had 
failed to show the court that “plaintiff’s suit was brought 
primarily to chill a valid exercise . . . of free speech or petition,” 
and thus had failed to satisfy their burden regarding the first 
prong’s “arising from” requirement.69 
In the course of reaching its holding, the Paul court was 
remarkably careful in framing how its decision should be 
understood by future parties and courts.70  The court made a 
point to emphasize that its decision “involve[d] a factual context 
in which the defendants have effectively conceded the illegal 
nature of their election campaign finance activities for which 
they claim constitutional protection.”71  As such,  
 
 64 Id. 
 65 Id. 
 66 Id. at 870. 
 67 Id. at 871. 
 68 Id. 
 69 Id. 
 70 See id.  
 71 Id. 
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there was no dispute on the point and we have concluded, as a matter 
of law, that such activities are not a valid exercise of constitutional 
rights as contemplated by section 425.16.  However, had there been a 
factual dispute as to the legality of defendants’ actions, then we could 
not so easily have disposed of defendants’ motion.72   
The court warned that, in future cases, where a plaintiff  
contests [the] point [of illegality], and unlike the case here, cannot 
demonstrate as a matter of law that the defendant’s acts do not fall 
under section 425.16’s protection, then the claimed illegitimacy of 
defendant’s acts is an issue which [the] plaintiff must raise and 
support in the context of the discharge of the plaintiff’s burden to 
provide a prima facie showing of the merits of the plaintiff’s case.73   
The Paul court further referred to this showing as  
an additional burden” which the plaintiff must meet “in the same 
manner the plaintiff meets the burden of demonstrating the merits of 
its causes of action: by showing the defendant’s purported 
constitutional defenses are not applicable to the case as a matter of 
law or by a prima facie showing of facts which, if accepted by the trier 
of fact, would negate such defenses.74 
Though the Paul court made these final points “[i]n order to 
avoid any misunderstanding as to the basis for [its] 
conclusions,”75 it may have instead created more confusion and 
uncertainty by its parting words than it would have otherwise.  
As the court acknowledged, its case was an easy one because the 
issue of illegality was not contested.76  Rather than limiting its 
opinion to the facts before it, however, the Paul court continued 
to opine as to how courts should proceed in the event they 
encountered different and more difficult facts.77  Where future 
cases involve disputed illegality, the court professed, an 
“additional burden” shifts to the plaintiff to show that defendant 
is not entitled to the constitutional protections it seeks.78  By 
referring to this burden as “additional” to the one already faced 
by the plaintiff in the context of the second prong, the Paul court 
seemingly created a third prong for cases specifically involving 
speech and petitioning activities which potentially cross the line 
of illegality.79  However, given the court’s ambiguity as to 
plaintiff’s “additional burden,” the third prong is at best 
amorphous under Paul. 
 
 72 Id. 
 73 Id. at 871–72. 
 74 Id.   
 75 Id. at 871. 
 76 Id. 
 77 Id. at 871–72. 
 78 Id. (emphasis omitted). 
 79 See id. at 872. 
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In the years following, Paul’s illegality exception was 
acknowledged and accepted by other appellate courts in 
California.80  Indeed, in 2002, California’s Fifth Appellate 
District was faced with an appeal where the plaintiff sought 
application of the illegality exception.81  In Kashian v. Harriman, 
a prominent businessman and civic leader (Kashian) sued an 
attorney (Harriman) for claims of unfair business practices and 
defamation in connection with several environmental lawsuits 
filed by Harriman, as well as a letter written by Harriman and 
later published by the Fresno Bee newspaper.82   
In response to Kashian’s complaint, Harriman filed an anti-
SLAPP motion, contending that his litigation activities and letter 
were absolutely privileged.83  Kashian opposed the motion 
primarily on second prong grounds, submitting evidence in 
support of the claims and arguing that the actions of Harriman 
were not privileged.84  The trial court granted the motion, and 
Kashian appealed.85  On appeal, Kashian shifted his focus, and 
argued that, under Paul, Harriman was not entitled to relief 
under the anti-SLAPP statute because the statute does not 
protect illegal activity.86  The appellate court, however, noted 
that the facts in Paul were distinguishable because, here, “the 
legality of Harriman’s litigation activities is a matter of 
considerable dispute.”87  The court went on to add that “conduct 
that would otherwise come within the scope of the anti-SLAPP 
statute does not lose its coverage . . . simply because it is alleged 
to have been unlawful or unethical.  If that were the test, the 
statute (and the privilege) would be meaningless.”88  The court, 
therefore, directed its attention to the second prong before 
ultimately affirming the trial court’s decision.89   
 
 80 See, e.g., City of L.A. v. Animal Def. League, 37 Cal. Rptr. 3d 632, 644 (Ct. App. 
2006); Huntingdon Life Scis., Inc. v. Stop Huntingdon Animal Cruelty U.S.A., Inc., 29 Cal. 
Rptr. 3d 521, 535 (Ct. App. 2005); 1-800 Contacts, Inc. v. Steinberg, 132 Cal. Rptr. 2d 789, 
801–02 (Ct. App. 2003); Yu v. Signet Bank/Va., 126 Cal. Rptr. 2d 516, 529 n.3 (Ct. App. 
2002); Governor Gray Davis Comm. v. Am. Taxpayers Alliance, 125 Cal. Rptr. 2d 534, 
541–42 (Ct. App. 2002); Chavez v. Mendoza, 114 Cal. Rptr. 2d 825, 830 (Ct. App. 2001). 
 81 Kashian v. Harriman, 120 Cal. Rptr. 2d 576, 589 (Ct. App. 2002). 
 82 Id. at 581–84. 
 83 Id. at 584. 
 84 Id. 
 85 Id. at 585. 
 86 Id. at 589. 
 87 Id. at 590. 
 88 Id. 
 89 Id. at 591, 609.  Interestingly, though the case involved a disputed allegation of 
illegality regarding Harriman’s petitioning activity, the court did not appear to engage in 
any “third prong” type of analysis contemplated by Paul. 
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Later in 2002, California’s First Appellate District similarly 
encountered an appeal involving a special motion to strike 
opposed on the basis of illegal petitioning activities.90  In 
Governor Gray Davis Committee v. American Taxpayers Alliance, 
a group supporting the reelection of Governor Gray Davis filed an 
action against a taxpayers group (“taxpayers”) responsible for a 
television commercial critical of Davis, claiming the taxpayers 
violated the Political Reform Act’s reporting requirements.91  
Taxpayers responded by filing a special motion to strike the 
complaint, characterizing Davis’ claims as “a classic SLAPP 
suit.”92  After the trial court denied the motion, the court of 
appeal reviewed the matter de novo.93  In addressing the 
illegality issue under the first prong analysis, the court observed 
that this case was again unlike Paul in that illegality had not 
been conceded by the defendant taxpayers, and the evidence did 
not otherwise conclusively establish illegality.94  Therefore, the 
court concluded that the defendant taxpayers had met its burden 
under the first prong, and the burden shifted to plaintiff Davis to 
establish a probability of prevailing on the merits.95 
Interestingly, in turning the matter over to the second prong 
analysis, the court referenced Paul’s guidance in handling 
matters of disputed illegality.96  Citing Paul, the Davis court 
observed that the “asserted violation of the Political Reform Act 
by appellant is an issue we must examine in the context of the 
discharge of the respondent’s burden to construct a prima facie 
showing of the merits of its case.”97  The court then analyzed the 
scope of the Political Reform Act in the face of the speech 
protections under the First Amendment.98  Concluding that the 
Political Reform Act must be read narrowly to preserve free 
speech rights, the court found that the plaintiff failed to establish 
a likelihood of prevailing on the merits.99  The court’s analysis in 
this respect negated Paul’s “additional burden” prophecy, 
engaging in the continued illegality analysis strictly through the 
second prong’s underlying merits examination.  As shown below, 
 
 90 See Governor Gray Davis Comm. v. Am. Taxpayers Alliance, 125 Cal. Rptr. 2d 534 
(Ct. App. 2002). 
 91 Id. at 538. 
 92 Id. at 539. 
 93 Id. 
 94 Id. at 542. 
 95 Id. (“[W]ith the legality of appellant’s exercise of a constitutionally protected right 
in dispute in the action, the threshold element in a section 425.16 inquiry has been 
established.”). 
 96 Id. at 541–42. 
 97 Id. at 542. 
 98 Id. at 551. 
 99 Id. at 551–52. 
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the Davis court’s deviation from Paul in this manner served as 
an early example of the inconsistent manner in which the 
illegality exception would be applied by California courts.100 
B. The California Supreme Court Endorses the Illegality 
Exception in Flatley v. Mauro 
In 2006, the California Supreme Court decided Flatley v. 
Mauro,101 the landmark case on the illegality exception.  With 
Flatley, the court gave even greater legitimacy to the exception, 
endorsing Paul’s analysis and application of the doctrine.102 
Flatley involved a dispute between an entertainer, Michael 
Flatley, and an attorney, Dean Mauro, who represented Tyna 
Marie Robertson (a former paramour of Flatley’s).103  Following a 
tryst between Robertson and Flatley, Mauro sent a letter to 
Flatley accusing him of sexually assaulting Robertson.104  The 
letter included a draft of an unfiled civil complaint against 
Flatley for the assault, and further demanded a settlement 
payment of $100 million.105  Mauro threatened that if settlement 
was not reached between the parties, Mauro would disclose 
various details of the incident and various other personal details 
about Flatley to the press and several governmental and law 
enforcement agencies.106  Mauro continued to make similar 
demands in several telephone calls with Flatley’s attorneys 
following this letter, where the settlement amount was described 
as at least “seven figures.”107 
Flatley did not pay Mauro, and Mauro subsequently filed the 
complaint against Flatley.108  Mauro and Robertson then 
appeared on television, recounting the allegations that Flatley 
had raped Robertson.109  Robertson later dismissed her claims 
against Flatley.110 
Meanwhile, Flatley filed suit against Mauro, alleging civil 
extortion, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and 
wrongful interference with economic advantage.111  The claims 
 
 100 See infra Parts II(B), II(C), & II(D). 
 101 Flatley v. Mauro, 139 P.3d 2 (Cal. 2006). 
 102 Id. at 13–14. 
 103 Id. at 5. 
 104 Id. at 6–7. 
 105 Id. at 7–8. 
 106 Id. 
 107 Id. at 8–9. 
 108 Id. at 5, 9. 
 109 Id. at 5. 
 110 Id. at 5 n.2. 
 111 Id. at 5. 
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were based upon the demand letter Flatley received from Mauro, 
as well as the telephone calls Mauro made to Flatley’s 
attorneys.112  Mauro responded to the complaint by filing a 
special motion to strike under the anti-SLAPP statute.113  Mauro 
argued that his communications were “prelitigation settlement 
offer[s],” and as such, Flatley’s claims arose from Mauro’s 
protected right of petition.114  Though he did not deny sending 
the letter in question nor did he contest the nature of the 
telephone calls as described by Flatley, Mauro nonetheless 
maintained that his activity on behalf of Robertson “amounted to 
no more than the kind of permissible settlement negotiations 
that are attendant upon any legal dispute or, at minimum, that a 
question of fact exists regarding the legality of his conduct,” 
which he claimed precluded a finding of illegality.115   
Predictably, Flatley opposed the motion.116  Flatley argued 
“Mauro’s communications constituted criminal extortion and 
were therefore not protected by the anti-SLAPP statute,” and 
that Flatley “could demonstrate a probability of prevailing on the 
merits.”117  The trial court denied the motion, and the court of 
appeal affirmed.118  “The Court of Appeal held that, because 
Mauro’s letter and subsequent telephone calls constituted 
criminal extortion as a matter of law, and extortionate speech is 
not constitutionally protected, the anti-SLAPP statute did not 
apply.”119  Mauro then appealed to the California Supreme 
Court.120 
In an opinion drafted by Justice Moreno, the supreme court 
relied heavily on Paul, devoting five pages of its opinion toward 
specifically reviewing and analyzing the Paul opinion.121  In the 
end, the court endorsed Paul’s application of the illegality 
exception: 
We agree with Paul that section 425.16 cannot be invoked by a 
defendant whose assertedly protected activity is illegal as a matter of 
law and, for that reason, not protected by constitutional guarantees of 
free speech and petition.  A contrary rule would be inconsistent with 
the purpose of the anti-SLAPP statute as revealed by its language.122  
 
 112 Id. 
 113 Id. 
 114 Id. at 9. 
 115 Id. at 21. 
 116 Id. 
 117 Id. at 6. 
 118 Id. at 5. 
 119 Id. 
 120 Id. 
 121 See id. at 10–14. 
 122 Id. at 13. 
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The supreme court went on to encapsulate the illegality 
exception as follows: 
[W]here a defendant brings a motion to strike under section 425.16 
based on a claim that the plaintiff’s action arises from activity by the 
defendant in furtherance of the defendant’s exercise of protected 
speech or petition rights, but either the defendant concedes, or the 
evidence conclusively establishes, that the assertedly protected speech 
or petition activity was illegal as a matter of law, the defendant is 
precluded from using the anti-SLAPP statute to strike the plaintiff’s 
action.123 
The court also made clear its position that determination of 
the illegality exception is strictly a first prong matter: 
[W]e emphasize that the question of whether the defendant’s 
underlying conduct was illegal as a matter of law is preliminary, and 
unrelated to the second prong question of whether the plaintiff has 
demonstrated a probability of prevailing, and the showing required to 
establish conduct illegal as a matter of law—either through 
defendant’s concession or by uncontroverted and conclusive evidence—
is not the same showing as the plaintiff’s second prong showing of 
probability of prevailing.124 
In turning to the specific facts before it, the court applied the 
illegality exception to Mauro’s detriment.  The court noted case 
law establishing the proposition that extortion is not a 
constitutionally protected form of speech.125  The court further 
observed that the facts establishing extortion were not in dispute 
since Mauro did not deny sending the letter or engaging in the 
telephone calls.126  Therefore, evaluating Mauro’s conduct, the 
court concluded that “the letter and subsequent phone calls 
constitute[d] criminal extortion as a matter of law.”127  The court 
relied upon sections 519(2) and (3) of the California Penal Code 
in emphasizing that “[t]hese communications threatened to 
‘accuse’ Flatley of, or ‘impute to him,’ ‘crime[s]’ and ‘disgrace’ 
unless Flatley paid Mauro.”128  That the threats were half-
couched in legalese, the court noted, does not disguise their 
essential character as extortion.129  Because Mauro’s actions 
amounted to extortion as a matter of law, and were therefore not 
constitutionally protected nor entitled to anti-SLAPP protection, 
 
 123 Id. at 15. 
 124 Id. (emphasis added). 
 125 Id. at 21. 
 126 Id. 
 127 Id. at 2. 
 128 Id. (quoting CAL. PENAL CODE § 519(2), (3) (West 2011)). 
 129 Id. 
Do Not Delete 1/31/2012 9:51 PM 
554 Chapman Law Review [Vol. 15:3 
the supreme court affirmed the denial of Mauro’s special motion 
to strike.130 
Notably, although the supreme court’s decision was 
unanimous, Justice Werdegar drafted a concurring opinion in 
Flatley, deviating sharply from the reasoning employed by 
Justice Moreno and the majority, and strongly cautioning against 
the adoption of an illegality exception.131  For one, he argued that 
such an exception is better left to the Legislature than the 
Judiciary.132  He pointed to the Legislature’s amendment of 
section 425.18(h), where it limited “SLAPPback” motions brought 
by parties whose actions in the underlying case were “illegal as a 
matter of law.”133  If the Legislature wanted a similar exception 
with respect to section 425.16, it could have adopted one 
statutorily.134 
Justice Werdegar also questioned the breadth of the 
majority’s illegality exception.135  He feared that, by precluding 
lawsuits based upon “illegal” actions, perhaps the exception 
would swallow the entire rule: “[s]ince by definition all conduct 
sued upon is alleged to be illegal, the majority’s assurances that 
the ‘narrow circumstance’ . . . for plaintiffs’ invoking an illegal-
as-a-matter-of-law defense to an anti-SLAPP motion will occur 
only in ‘rare cases’ . . . are not convincing.”136 
Justice Werdegar also criticized the practicality of treating 
the illegality exception solely as a first prong issue: “[t]he 
standard the majority articulates for its new exception . . . is 
virtually indistinguishable from the standard we previously have 
articulated for satisfying the statute’s second prong.”137  Justice 
Werdegar referenced the supreme court’s prior opinion in 
Navellier v. Sletten, cautioning that the majority’s now 
conflicting guidance is likely to cause confusion among lower 
courts.  He further added that the similarity between application 
of the illegality exception and the second prong analysis  
may well sow doctrinal confusion among courts previously given to 
understand that “any claimed illegitimacy of the defendant’s acts is an 
issue which the plaintiff must raise and support in the context of the 
 
 130 Id. at 24. 
 131 Id. at 24–26 (Werdegar, J., concurring). 
 132 Id. 
 133 Id.  As discussed more fully below, a “SLAPPback” motion is essentially an anti-
SLAPP motion seeking to dismiss a malicious prosecution action brought in response to 
an earlier action previously dismissed by an anti-SLAPP motion. 
 134 Id. 
 135 Id. at 25–26. 
 136 Id. at 25 (quoting Flatley, 139 P.3d at 12, 15). 
 137 Id. at 26. 
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discharge of the plaintiff’s [secondary] burden to provide a prima facie 
showing of the merits of the plaintiff’s case.”138  
In the end, however, Justice Werdegar agreed that Mauro 
was not entitled to relief under the anti-SLAPP statute.139  He 
concluded that Mauro failed to show that the lawsuit arose from 
protected speech or petitioning activity.140  In other words, while 
the majority concluded Mauro was not entitled to protection 
because his speech and petitioning activity was illegal, Justice 
Werdegar found that the lawsuit was not based upon speech or 
petitioning activity in the first place.141  The gravamen of 
Flatley’s claims was Mauro’s attempt to extort money from him, 
and, according to Werdegar, such an action does not arise from 
protected speech or petitioning.142  
The Werdegar concurrence raised several red flags 
concerning the application of Flatley, Paul, and the illegality 
exception in future cases.  Notably, should the judiciary expand 
on developing this doctrine when the Legislature has not 
specifically incorporated the doctrine into the anti-SLAPP statute 
(despite having done so with respect to section 425.18)?  And, 
what exactly does “illegality as a matter of law” mean?  Is it not 
true that every lawsuit potentially involves allegations of 
illegality?  Finally, is the illegality exception truly a first prong 
issue, or does Flatley’s pronouncement of the exception render it 
identical to the analysis called for under the second prong?  As 
shown below, while some cases have applied Flatley and Paul 
with little difficulty or confusion, others seem to fall directly into 
the pitfalls Justice Werdegar raised, rendering future application 
of these doctrines inconsistent and perhaps unpredictable.143 
C. Applying the Illegality Exception Immediately After Flatley 
i.  Soukup v. Law Offices of Herbert Hafif 
It did not take long to see Flatley’s direct impact on other 
cases.  In a companion case to Flatley, the California Supreme 
Court rendered its decision in Soukup v. Law Offices of Herbert 
Hafif,144 on the same day it announced its decision in Flatley.  
Though Soukup’s facts differ from Flatley, its decision sheds 
 
 138 Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Navellier v. Sletten, 52 P.3d 703, 712 (Cal. 
2002)). 
 139 Id. at 24. 
 140 Id. 
 141 Id. 
 142 Id. 
 143 See infra Part II(C). 
 144 Soukup v. Law Offices of Herbert Hafif, 139 P.3d 30 (Cal. 2006).  
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further clarification on the reasoning and intent underlying the 
Flatley decision. 
In Soukup, the plaintiff (Peggy Soukup) was a former 
employee of defendant (Law Offices of Herbert Hafif or 
“LOHH”).145  LOHH had previously sued Soukup and others for 
malicious prosecution, among other claims, in an underlying 
action.146  Soukup moved to strike that action based upon the 
anti-SLAPP statute, and the court granted her motion and 
dismissed LOHH’s claims against Soukup.147 
Following the dismissal of LOHH’s claims in the underlying 
action, Soukup filed a new action against LOHH and others, 
claiming abuse of process and malicious prosecution.148  In turn, 
LOHH and the other defendants moved to strike Soukup’s claim 
based upon the anti-SLAPP statute.149  LOHH’s anti-SLAPP 
motion created a “SLAPPback” scenario, but, at the time this 
motion had been filed, the California Legislature had not yet 
adopted the SLAPPback legislation that exists today.150  Soukup 
opposed LOHH’s motion, arguing that the underlying activity 
upon which her suit was based is, by definition, not protected 
speech because she had already achieved its dismissal by way of 
her prior anti-SLAPP motion.151  The trial court ultimately 
denied LOHH’s motion.152  LOHH appealed and the court of 
appeal reversed, leading to an appeal to the California Supreme 
Court.153 
During the time after the trial court denied LOHH’s motion 
to strike and before the supreme court made its decision, the 
California Legislature enacted new legislation regarding 
SLAPPbacks.154  This legislation sought to protect litigants who 
had previously been successful in dismissing claims by use of the 
anti-SLAPP statute and who subsequently filed malicious 
prosecution actions against their SLAPPers (an action known as 
 
 145 Id. at 35. 
 146 Id. at 38. 
 147 Id. at 39. 
 148 Id. at 40. 
 149 Id.  
 150 Id. at 35. 
 151 Id. at 40. 
 152 Id. at 41. 
 153 Id.  The appellate court first affirmed, but was directed to reconsider its ruling in 
light of the California Supreme Court’s decisions in Jarrow Formulas, Inc. v. LaMarche, 
74 P.3d 737 (Cal. 2003), and Navellier v. Sletten, 52 P.3d 703 (Cal. 2002). Soukup, 139 
P.3d at 42.  Upon reconsideration in light of Jarrow and Navellier, the court of appeal 
reversed, leading to Soukup’s petition for review to the California Supreme Court. Id. 
 154 Soukup, 139 P.3d at 35. 
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a “SLAPPback”).155  As part of the new legislation, the 
Legislature incorporated its own illegality exception with respect 
to special motions to strike SLAPPback suits: “A special motion 
to strike may not be filed against a SLAPPback by a party whose 
filing or maintenance of the prior cause of action from which the 
SLAPPback arises was illegal as a matter of law.”156   
In light of the newly enacted SLAPPback legislation, Soukup 
argued to the supreme court that LOHH is not entitled to anti-
SLAPP relief given the SLAPPback statute’s illegality 
exception.157  She argued that LOHH’s underlying lawsuit was a 
violation of state and federal law, namely section 1102.5 of the 
California Labor Code and 29 U.S.C. § 1140.158  The supreme 
court disagreed with Soukup insofar as it concluded that she 
could not establish a violation of these statutes as a matter of 
law.159  Both of the statutes were forms of 
retaliation/whistleblower regulations, which required that she 
prove the existence of an employer-employee relationship 
between LOHH and herself.160  Because Soukup was not an 
employee at the time the actions had been filed, she could not 
establish violations of these statutes as a matter of law.161  
Accordingly, the court concluded the first prong of the analysis 
had been satisfied and the matter would hinge upon a 
determination under the second prong’s probability of prevailing 
analysis.162 
Though Soukup differentiates itself from Flatley in the sense 
that its decision hinges upon its application and interpretation of 
section 425.18 of the California Civil Procedure Code, rather than 
section 425.16, several notable aspects of the opinion shed light 
upon the court’s intention behind Flatley.  For one, it is 
interesting to note that Soukup sought to employ the illegality 
exception based upon two non-criminal statutes.163  In other 
words, Soukup’s argument completely avoided the question of 
whether illegality requires criminality in this context.  And even 
though the Supreme Court ultimately disagreed with Soukup’s 
application of the illegality exception, it did so on grounds other 
than criminality.164  It would appear to have been much easier for 
 
 155 Id. at 42–43. 
 156 CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.18(h) (West Supp. 2011). 
 157 Soukup, 139 P.3d at 45. 
 158 Id. 
 159 Id. at 48. 
 160 Id. at 48–49. 
 161 Id. 
 162 Id. at 50–51. 
 163 Id. at 45. 
 164 Id. at 49. 
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the court to dispose of Soukup’s argument by noting that the 
statutes she relied upon were not criminal statutes, and thus she 
was not entitled to the illegality exception.  The fact that the 
court did not do so may be persuasive support for those who 
believe that the illegality exception does not necessarily require a 
showing of criminality. 
While the court did not discuss or address criminality, it did 
bring a new concept into the discussion: specificity.165  In the 
process of discussing the meaning and impact of the illegality 
exception contained in section 425.18(h), the court noted that one 
aspect of plaintiff’s burden in establishing illegality is to identify 
the illegality with specificity.166  The court advised that “the 
plaintiff must identify with particularity the statute or statutes 
violated by the filing and maintenance of the underlying 
action.”167  The court further added: 
[A]s part of the plaintiff’s burden of demonstrating illegality as a 
matter of law, the plaintiff must show the specific manner in which 
the statute or statutes were violated with reference to their elements.  
A generalized assertion that a particular statute was violated by the 
filing or maintenance of the underlying action without a 
particularized showing of the violation will be insufficient to 
demonstrate illegality as a matter of law.168 
Therefore, following Soukup, a plaintiff who intends to 
invoke the illegality exception need not necessarily show that the 
actions in question were criminal, but must provide the 
particular law establishing the illegality, and the specific manner 
in which the law was violated.169 
Finally, on a larger scale, one must question whether 
Soukup’s reasoning even applies to the development of the 
illegality exception in the context of section 425.16.  After all, 
Soukup’s decision is dependent upon its interpretation of the 
legislatively-provided illegality exception in section 425.18.170  As 
Justice Werdegar noted in Flatley, if the Legislature wanted this 
same type of analysis applied in section 425.16, it would have 
amended the statute to reflect this desire, much the way it 
implemented the exception in section 425.18(h).171  On the other 
hand, Soukup’s analysis and reasoning regarding how section 
425.18(h) should be interpreted and implemented is largely based 
 
 165 Id. at 48. 
 166 Id. 
 167 Id. 
 168 Id. 
 169 Id. at 48.  See also Hutton v. Hafif, 59 Cal. Rptr. 3d 109, 119–20 (Ct. App. 2007). 
 170 Soukup, 139 P.3d at 47–48. 
 171 Flatley v. Mauro, 139 P.3d 2, 25 (Cal. 2006) (Werdegar, J., concurring). 
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upon its reading of the Paul and Davis opinions, both of which 
were entirely based upon section 425.16.172  Because those cases 
shaped the court’s interpretation of the legislatively-created 
illegality exception in section 425.18(h), it seems only natural to 
use that same interpretation as it applies to the judicially-
created illegality exception to section 425.16. 
ii.  Novartis Vaccines and Diagnostics, Inc. v. Stop 
Huntingdon Animal Cruelty USA, Inc. 
In the months following the Flatley decision, potential 
confusion as to how to apply the illegality exception began to 
show among California appellate courts.173  One particular case, 
Novartis Vaccines and Diagnostics, Inc. v. Stop Huntingdon 
Animal Cruelty USA, Inc., involved an advocacy group 
(defendant) who was formed as part of an effort to “expose the 
abusive treatment of animals” by Huntingdon Life Sciences, a 
biomedical testing lab.174  Plaintiff, Novartis Vaccines and 
Diagnostics, Inc., a biopharmaceutical company, used 
Huntingdon in testing some of its products.175  Defendant 
engaged in a campaign against plaintiff in which it carried out 
“home visits” to plaintiff’s employees, during which defendant’s 
agents terrorized plaintiff’s employees by breaking their 
windows, vandalizing their cars, and setting off alarms in their 
yards, among other tactics.176  Plaintiff filed suit against 
defendant seeking an injunction against those acts.177 
In response to the complaint, defendant filed a special 
motion to strike under the anti-SLAPP statute.178  Defendant did 
not deny that it engaged in the actions complained of, but rather, 
claimed that its actions were protected activity under the anti-
SLAPP statute because they centered around speech made in a 
public forum in connection with a matter of public interest.179  
The trial court denied the motion, however, concluding that 
defendant “had not met its burden.”180 
On appeal, California’s First Appellate District relied upon 
Flatley in articulating the application of the illegality exception.  
 
 172 Soukup, 139 P.3d at 46–47.  
 173 See, e.g., Novartis Vaccines & Diagnostics, Inc. v. Stop Huntingdon Animal 
Cruelty USA, Inc., 50 Cal. Rptr. 3d 27, 34–36 (Ct. App. 2006); Guzzetta v. City of Desert 
Hot Springs, No. D049595, 2007 WL 549828, at *6 (Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 23, 2007). 
 174 Id. at 29. 
 175 Id. 
 176 Id. 
 177 Id. 
 178 Id. 
 179 Id. at 30. 
 180 Id. at 35. 
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Quoting Flatley, the Novartis court noted that “section 425.16 
cannot be invoked by a defendant whose assertedly protected 
activity is illegal as a matter of law and, for that reason, not 
protected by constitutional guarantees of free speech and 
petition.”181  With that principle in mind, the court then turned to 
the facts at hand. 
It was at this point the court’s analysis began to reveal 
confusion in applying Flatley.182  The court engaged in a thorough 
analysis of whether the conduct of defendant amounted to 
illegality.183  The court noted that the evidence of defendant’s 
acts was not in dispute, and that defendant had essentially 
conceded that the attacks on plaintiff’s employees were 
unlawful.184  As such, the court concluded, the defendant’s 
statements were “not the sort of speech section 425.16 was 
designed to protect.”185  
What is perhaps most confusing about the Novartis opinion 
is whether it is applying the illegality exception at all.  Clearly 
there was an apparent intent to apply the exception, given the 
opinion’s thorough review of the Flatley decision.186  As we know 
from Paul and Flatley, the plaintiff holds the burden of proof in 
establishing that defendant’s purported protected activity is 
illegal as a matter of law.187  However, in Novartis, the court held 
that the trial court was correct in concluding that defendant “had 
failed to show that” the complaint was aimed at speech protected 
by section 425.16.188  To this end, it appears that Novartis’ ruling 
is based upon a failure by defendant to satisfy its burden.  
However, under Paul and Flatley, a defendant would never have 
had the burden of disproving illegality in the first instance.  As 
such, either the illegality exception was applied incorrectly here 
(i.e., the court improperly placed the burden on defendant instead 
of plaintiff), or it was not applied at all (i.e., the court determined 
that it was not speech in the first instance, rather than speech 
which lost its protection due to illegality).189 
 
 181 Id. at 34. 
 182 Id. at 35. 
 183 Id. at 35–36. 
 184 Id. at 35. 
 185 Id. at 36. 
 186 Id. at 34. 
 187 See Flatley v. Mauro, 139 P.3d 2, 12 (Cal. 2006); Paul for Council v. Hanyecz, 102 
Cal. Rptr. 2d 864, 871–72 (Ct. App. 2001).  
 188 Novartis, 50 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 36. 
 189 Interestingly, another aspect of Novartis’ application of the anti-SLAPP statute 
reveals confusion.  Once the court concluded that defendant had failed to satisfy the first 
prong, the opinion went ahead and analyzed whether plaintiff had satisfied its burden on 
the second prong. See id. at 36–39.  However, this second prong analysis is superfluous 
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iii.  Birkner v. Lam 
A year after the Novartis decision, California’s First 
Appellate District again addressed the application of the 
illegality exception in Birkner v. Lam.190  In this case, the 
defendant, Lam, appealed the denial of his special motion to 
strike after the trial court concluded the plaintiffs’ causes of 
action were not based upon petitioning activity.191  Though the 
trial court did not find that the activity complained of (the service 
and refusal to rescind a notice to terminate plaintiffs’ tenancy) 
was illegal, it concluded that it did not arise from petitioning 
activity.192 
On appeal, the court considered both the “arising from” and 
illegality arguments.193  With respect to the former, the court 
observed that although the prosecution of an unlawful detainer 
action itself is protected activity under the anti-SLAPP statute, 
the termination of a tenancy is generally not protected.194  
However, where the service of a termination notice is a 
prerequisite for filing an unlawful detainer action, as it was in 
this case, such service does constitute activity in furtherance of a 
constitutionally protected right to petition.195  Therefore, the 
court ruled, defendant’s burden on the first prong had been 
satisfied.196 
The plaintiff then argued that the protection of the anti-
SLAPP statute should nonetheless be denied in this case because 
Lam’s actions in serving the termination notice (in violation of 
the San Francisco Administrative Control’s rent ordinance 
regulation) were illegal as a matter of law.197  The court 
disagreed, holding that the evidence did not “conclusively 
establish” Lam’s conduct was illegal as a matter of law.198  
Notably, the court’s ruling did not reference any need for 
criminality in this context.  Rather, the court simply decided 
that, because the presented evidence failed to show even a 
violation of the rent ordinance, the illegality exception did not 
apply.199  Again, it would seem to have been much easier for the 
 
and extraneous in that failure to satisfy the first prong should mean immediate denial of 
the motion.  There was no need to engage in second prong analysis. 
 190 Birkner v. Lam, 67 Cal. Rptr. 3d 190 (Ct. App. 2007). 
 191 Id. at 192. 
 192 Id. at 194. 
 193 Id. at 195–98. 
 194 Id. at 195. 
 195 Id.  
 196 Id. at 197–98.  
 197 Id. at 198.  
 198 Id. 
 199 Id. 
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court to dispose of defendant’s illegality argument by simply 
pointing to the fact that no criminal violations had been asserted. 
iv.  Cohen v. Brown 
California’s Second Appellate District rendered its first 
significant decision on the post-Flatley illegality exception in 
Cohen v. Brown.200  This case involved a dispute among two 
attorneys who were retained to prosecute a personal injury case 
on behalf of a person injured in a car accident.201  Brown had 
been retained at the outset of the underlying case and filed the 
complaint.202  Shortly before trial, Brown contacted Cohen to 
obtain his services in preparing for and trying the case.203  Cohen 
claimed, however, that Brown misrepresented the amount of 
work required on the case and the level of experience Brown had 
in trying cases such as this.204  When the case settled before trial, 
Brown informed Cohen that he would not be getting any portion 
of the attorney’s fees realized from the settlement.205  Brown 
further threatened (and later acted upon his threat) to file a 
complaint with the State Bar against Cohen, in an effort to force 
Cohen to authorize the release of funds to the underlying 
plaintiff (with no funds going to Cohen).206 
Cohen filed suit against Brown for extortion, among other 
claims.207  Brown filed a special motion to strike, claiming his 
actions in furtherance of the State Bar complaint were protected 
petitioning activity.208  The trial court denied Brown’s motion, 
concluding that his actions had an “extortive context,” and were 
therefore illegal as a matter of law.209  Brown appealed.210 
On appeal, the appellate court relied upon Flatley in 
observing that “extortion is not constitutionally protected speech 
and thus cannot constitute the ‘valid’ exercise of speech and 
petition that is protected by section 425.16.”211  The court went on 
to conclude that, as in Flatley, Brown’s actions amounted to 
extortion under sections 518, et seq. of the California Penal 
 
 200 Cohen v. Brown, 93 Cal. Rptr. 3d 24 (Ct. App. 2009). 
 201 Id. at 27–28. 
 202 Id.  
 203 Id. at 28. 
 204 Id. at 29. 
 205 Id. at 30. 
 206 Id. at 30–31.  
 207 Id. at 31–32. 
 208 Id. at 32. 
 209 Id. at 34. 
 210 Id.  
 211 Id. at 36 (quoting Flatley v. Mauro, 139 P.3d 2, 21 (Cal. 2006)).  
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Code.212  Having determined that Brown’s stated basis for relief 
under the anti-SLAPP statute was not viable, the court ended 
the inquiry before reaching the second prong.213  Therefore, 
although the court did not explicitly address whether criminality 
must be shown before the illegality exception is applied, the 
opinion is notable in that it did rely upon the violation of the 
Penal Code before applying the illegality exception.214 
D. California Appellate Courts Transform the Illegality 
Exception into a “Criminality” Exception 
i.  Cabral v. Martins 
Perhaps in recognition of Justice Werdegar’s concern that 
the illegality exception would swallow the anti-SLAPP doctrine 
as a whole, or perhaps as a consequence of the ambiguous scope 
and meaning of the term “illegal as a matter of law,” California 
appellate courts have begun to deviate from the original 
reasoning in Paul and have started to shape the doctrine into a 
consideration of criminality more than illegality.215  Though, as 
shown above, the criminality question indirectly played into 
several previous decisions, the first opinion to fully commit to the 
criminality requirement appears to be Cabral v. Martins.216   
Cabral arose from a divorced couple’s ongoing dispute over 
the ex-husband’s unpaid child support.217  Meanwhile, the ex-
husband’s mother revised her estate plan to disinherit him from 
her estate.218  The ex-wife, having had past difficulty in collecting 
her judgment against her ex-husband, filed suit against, among 
others, the attorneys who assisted in revising the mother’s estate 
plan.219  The ex-wife’s claim relied upon a California statute 
authorizing damages against those who assist a child support 
obligor in avoiding payment obligations (sections 1714.4 and 
1714.41 of the California Civil Code).220  The attorneys filed a 
 
 212 Id. at 36–37. 
 213 Id. at 37. 
 214 Id.  
 215 See, e.g., Gerbrosi v. Gaims, Weil, West & Epstein, LLP, 122 Cal. Rptr. 3d 73, 82 
(Ct. App. 2011); Ogunsalu v. Gill, No. D057612, 2011 WL 1457190, at *6 (Ct. App. Apr. 
15, 2011); Freisleben v. Riper, No. G042825, 2011 WL 940975, at *4–5 (Ct. App. Mar. 18, 
2011); Mendoza v. ADP Screening & Selection Servs., Inc., 107 Cal. Rptr. 3d 294, 303 (Ct. 
App. 2010); G.R. v. Intelligator, 110 Cal. Rptr. 3d 559, 567 (Ct. App. 2010); Roosen v. 
Farrell, No. B209873, 2010 WL 3371510, at *10 (Ct. App. Aug. 27, 2010); Cabral v. 
Martins, 99 Cal. Rptr. 3d 394, 403 (Ct. App. 2009). 
 216 Cabral v. Martins, 99 Cal. Rptr. 3d 394 (Ct. App. 2009).  
 217 Id. at 398. 
 218 Id. 
 219 Id. 
 220 Id. at 399. 
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special motion to strike the ex-wife’s claims, claiming protection 
under the anti-SLAPP statute.221  The trial court granted the 
motion and the ex-wife appealed.222 
On appeal, the ex-wife sought to employ the illegality 
exception by arguing that the attorneys’ actions cannot be 
protected because they violated the child support evasion 
statute.223  The appellate court disagreed, concluding that even if 
the attorneys had violated the statute, the ex-wife’s argument 
was without merit.224  The court believed that the ex-wife’s 
attempted reliance upon Flatley and Paul was misplaced.225  
Flatley, the court noted, was distinguishable from the ex-wife’s 
case because in Flatley the court took caution in limiting its 
holding “to ‘the specific and extreme circumstances of [the] case,’ 
in which the assertedly protected communications, as a matter of 
law, fell outside the ambit of protected speech.”226  The court 
distinguished Paul by noting, in that case, the allegedly 
protected actions of the defendants “were admittedly illegal, 
under the provisions of a statutory scheme specifically aimed at 
confining otherwise protected political activity within 
constitutionally valid bounds.”227 
The Cabral court further pointed out that, unlike in Flatley 
and Paul, in Cabral’s case “the attorney respondents’ actions in 
the course of the probate proceedings and the litigation defense 
were neither inherently criminal nor otherwise outside the scope 
of normal, routine legal services.”228  The court went on, noting 
that “[e]ven if the attorney respondents’ actions had the effect of 
defeating or forestalling [the ex-wife’s] ability to execute her 
judgment for child support, thereby (according to [the ex-wife]) 
violating the child support evasion statutes, this is not the kind 
of illegality involved in Flatley . . . and Paul . . . .”229  In light of 
these observations, the court went on to hold that the attorneys’ 
actions satisfied the first prong’s inquiry of the anti-SLAPP 
analysis.230 
Though Cabral purported to rely upon and apply the 
reasoning behind Paul and Flatley, a closer review of the Cabral 
 
 221 Id. at 399–400.  
 222 Id. at 400. 
 223 Id. at 402. 
 224 Id. 
 225 Id. 
 226 Id. (quoting Flatley v. Mauro, 139 P.3d 2, 24 n.16 (2006)).  
 227 Id. at 403. 
 228 Id. (emphasis added). 
 229 Id. (emphasis added). 
 230 Id. at 404.  
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opinion against the backdrop of Paul and Flatley reveals a 
marked deviation from the prior cases.  Indeed, as emphasized in 
the excerpt from the court’s opinion above, the Cabral court 
distinguished its case from Paul and Flatley on the basis that it 
did not involve inherently criminal behavior.231  However, Paul 
(which was wholly endorsed by Flatley) did not involve any 
allegation that the defendant had violated the Penal Code or 
committed any other criminal act.  Instead, the plaintiff in Paul 
accused the defendant of violating election laws, not criminal 
laws.232  Additionally, nowhere in the Flatley decision does the 
supreme court ever discuss the phrase “inherently criminal.”  
The Cabral court seems to have made up the “inherently 
criminal” standard here. 
Moreover, the Cabral court fails to offer any explanation as 
to what it means by actions that are “outside the scope of normal, 
routine legal services,” or what “kind of illegality” is sufficient for 
the illegality exception.233  Since Paul and Flatley never mention 
these concepts, Paul and Flatley provide us with no insight as to 
their meaning.  In fact, as many of the anti-SLAPP cases 
preceding Cabral have illustrated, the meaning of the phrase 
“illegal as a matter of law” already caused a significant amount 
of uncertainty in this area of law.234  With Cabral’s introduction 
of additional inquiries regarding the “inherent” criminality of an 
act, the breadth of scope for “normal, routine services,” and the 
undefined “kind of illegality” deserving of separate treatment 
over other unspecified types of illegality, it is even less clear what 
is required to employ the illegality exception after Cabral than it 
was before.235  Indeed, following Cabral, many would reasonably 
conclude that the illegality exception is simply a discretionary 
consideration the trial court should employ depending upon the 
allegations, evidence, and statutory violations in question on a 
case-by-case basis.  The problem with such a conclusion is that, 
under well-established appellate authority, the standard of 
review regarding a trial court’s anti-SLAPP ruling is de novo, not 
abuse of discretion;236 and as such, the determination by the trial 
judge in the first instance simply cannot be one of discretion on a 
case-by-case basis.  Beyond that, however, a trial court’s required 
approach regarding the illegality exception following Cabral 
appears undefined. 
 
 231 Id. at 403. 
 232 Id. at 402. 
 233 Id. at 403. 
 234 See supra Part II(A)–(C).  
 235 Cabral, 99 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 403. 
 236 See Oasis W. Realty, LLC v. Goldman, 250 P.3d 1115, 1120 (Cal. 2011).  
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ii.  Mendoza v. ADP Screening and Selection Services, Inc. 
Once Cabral planted the flag for a criminality approach to 
the illegality exception, other cases soon began to cement its 
stake.237  One notable example of such a case is found in Mendoza 
v. ADP Screening and Selection Services, Inc.238  In Mendoza, the 
plaintiff sued an employment-screening company (“SASS”), 
seeking damages purportedly incurred when the screening 
company provided information from the “Megan’s Law” website 
to an employer with whom plaintiff had applied for 
employment.239  Plaintiff claimed SASS improperly used 
information from the website for purposes related to 
employment, which amounts to a violation of sections 
290.46(1)(2)(E) and (4)(A) of the California Penal Code, and 
subjects the company to a civil claim for damages.240 
SASS responded to the complaint with a special motion to 
strike, claiming that it had a constitutional right under the anti-
SLAPP statute to republish information from the website to its 
clients.241  Though SASS admitted to causing the proliferation of 
this information, it claimed that its actions did not violate the 
Penal Code section prohibiting “use” of the information for 
employment purposes.242  The trial court granted the motion to 
strike and plaintiff appealed.243 
On appeal, the court considered, among other issues, 
whether SASS’ actions in using information from the Megan’s 
Law website amounted to illegality sufficient to preclude 
application of the anti-SLAPP statute.244  Plaintiff relied upon 
Flatley in arguing that SASS’ violation of the applicable Penal 
Code sections triggered the illegality exception of the anti-SLAPP 
statute.245   
The appellate court disagreed, based in large part on its 
conclusion that “the [California] Supreme Court’s use of the 
phrase ‘illegal’ [in Flatley] was intended to mean criminal, and 
not merely violative of a statute.”246  The court supported its 
conclusion with two levels of reasoning.  For one, it noted, the 
 
 237 See supra note 215. 
 238 Mendoza v. ADP Screening & Selection Servs., Inc., 107 Cal. Rptr. 3d 294 (Ct. 
App. 2010).  
 239 Id. at 298–99.  
 240 Id. at 298. 
 241 Id. at 299.  
 242 Id.  
 243 Id. at 300. 
 244 See id. at 301–03. 
 245 Id. at 302–03. 
 246 Id. at 303. 
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Flatley court applied the illegality exception upon a finding that 
Mauro had engaged in criminal extortion, punishable under the 
Penal Code.247  Second, the court reasoned, Flatley could not have 
intended for just any statutory violation to trigger the illegality 
exception because such an approach would undermine the anti-
SLAPP statute in the first place.248  The court opined that, 
because a “plaintiff’s complaint always alleges” some illegal 
conduct, a mere statutory violation would give the plaintiff too 
easy an opportunity to cancel out the speech protections intended 
by the anti-SLAPP statute (reasoning that seems more connected 
to Flatley’s concurrence than its majority opinion).249 
In applying its interpretation of Flatley to the facts before it, 
the Mendoza court concluded that the illegality exception did not 
apply.250  The court found SASS’ conduct was neither illegal nor 
criminal, as those terms are applied in the anti-SLAPP 
context.251  Notably, the court drew this conclusion despite the 
fact that the acts in question violated provisions of the Penal 
Code.  To this point, the court observed that the particular Penal 
Code sections violated here (sections 290.46(j) and (l)) did not 
amount to either a misdemeanor or felony; instead, they either 
served as an enhancement statute (as in subdivision (j)), or they 
served to provide civil remedies to the acts in question (as in 
subdivision (l)).252 
The plaintiff encouraged the appellate court to consider 
Novartis, which involved underlying allegations of criminal 
conspiracy.253  The appellate court distinguished Novartis, 
however, from the instant case.254  Although the court admitted 
that, in Novartis, the conduct in question amounted to criminal 
conspiracy sufficient to deny anti-SLAPP relief, here, the court 
noted, SASS’ conduct was “not of the same criminal nature.”255  
The court failed to expand any further on this point to describe 
what it meant by the phrase “same criminal nature.”  In the end, 
the court noted, the illegality exception did not apply because 
“SASS did not concede that its underlying conduct was criminal, 
nor did the evidence conclusively establish that its conduct was 
criminal.”256 
 
 247 Id. 
 248 Id. 
 249 Id. 
 250 Id. 
 251 Id. 
 252 Id. 
 253 Id. 
 254 Id. 
 255 Id. 
 256 Id. For similar treatment by subsequent courts, see Cross v. Cooper, 127 Cal. 
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Among the interesting aspects of the Mendoza opinion is the 
path it takes to arrive at and utilize criminality in the illegality 
exception.  The Mendoza court relies almost entirely upon Flatley 
in its conclusion that an act must be criminal to be exempted 
from protection under the statute.257  On the other hand, at no 
point does the court ever cite to the Cabral decision.  Yet, a 
simple review of the two opinions shows that nowhere in the 
Flatley decision does the court ever indicate an act must be 
“criminal” to be exempted, while Cabral could hardly make the 
point less emphatically, as discussed supra.  Perhaps the 
Mendoza court preferred to rely upon supreme court precedent 
over appellate court precedent, but one would think at least a 
passing reference to Cabral would have been appropriate. 
Another notable characteristic in Mendoza’s analysis is its 
willingness to boldly assert principles missing from the precedent 
it cites.  For example, the court concludes that the illegality 
exception requires a showing that the violation in question 
amounts to either a misdemeanor or felony.258  Yet, nowhere in 
Flatley, Paul, or any other case on the matter, has a California 
court ever concluded a misdemeanor or felony penalty is required 
for an act to be exempted from the anti-SLAPP statute.  Indeed, 
the Paul opinion never uses the words “crime” or “criminal,” nor 
does it ever contemplate any potential criminal consequences 
and/or punishments of the underlying act—money laundering.  
Certainly, if the Paul court had intended for criminality and 
punishment to be its guide, it would surely have commented at 
least once as to the criminal, rather than mere illegal, nature of 
the conduct in question.  Similarly, the Flatley court never 
discusses “substantive crimes” versus other, undefined non-
substantive crimes, in considering application of the illegality 
exception.  Yet, the Mendoza court used this as a point of 
distinction between its facts and Flatley’s.  Indeed, with the 
exception of Cabral, every case preceding Mendoza emphasized 
“illegality” and “unlawfulness” far more than criminality in 
determining the application of the illegality exception.   
 
Rptr. 3d 903, 925, 929 (Ct. App. 2011) (holding that defendant was entitled to anti-SLAPP 
protection since criminal conduct was not conceded and uncontroverted evidence did not 
establish criminal activity); and Fremont Reorganizing Corp. v. Faigin, No. B218178, 
2011 WL 3806350, at *8 (Ct. App. Aug. 30, 2011) (holding that the anti-SLAPP statute 
could apply since the conduct in question was not illegal).  
 257 Mendoza, 107 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 303. 
 258 Id. 
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iii.  G.R. v. Intelligator 
Nearly a year after California’s First Appellate District 
decided Cabral, the Fourth Appellate District considered (and by 
implication, adopted) the criminality requirement described by 
Cabral and Mendoza.  In G.R. v. Intelligator259 the court of 
appeal considered whether the illegality exception applied in an 
action for invasion of privacy by an ex-husband against his 
former wife’s attorney.260  The husband claimed Intelligator 
invaded his privacy when, during marital dissolution 
proceedings, Intelligator filed a copy of the husband’s credit 
report with the court without first redacting the husband’s 
sensitive and personal information in the report.261 
Intelligator acknowledged her failure to redact, and further 
conceded that her actions amounted to a violation of Rule 1.20 of 
the California Rules of Court.262  Yet, Intelligator contended she 
was entitled to relief under the anti-SLAPP statute because her 
actions were protected petitioning activity (in other words, 
Flatley did not apply here).263  Husband, on the other hand, 
argued that the illegality exception precluded anti-SLAPP relief 
for Intelligator because her actions violated a rule of court.264 
The court disagreed with the husband, asserting that 
Cabral, Paul, and Flatley, establish that conduct must be found 
criminal before it will be exempted from the protections of the 
anti-SLAPP statute.265  Considering the facts before it, the court 
concluded (as in Cabral) that the redaction of personal identifiers 
and subsequent violation of the rules of court was “not the type of 
criminal activity addressed in either Flatley . . . or Paul.”266  The 
husband pointed to the potential sanctions an attorney faces as 
punishment for violating a rule of court.267  The court of appeal 
found that to be unpersuasive, however, observing that “if an 
attorney were subject to a separate action each time he or she 
committed a rule violation in the representation of his or her 
client, the effect would be to chill the hearty pursuit of a 
protected activity—the right to petition.”268  In light of these 
 
 259 G.R. v. Intelligator, 110 Cal. Rptr. 3d 559 (Ct. App. 2010). 
 260 Id. at 562. 
 261 Id. 
 262 Id. at 561, 565. 
 263 See id. at 564–67 (citing cases to determine what was protected activity, 
supporting Intelligator’s argument that the anti-SLAPP statute could apply). 
 264 Id. at 564. 
 265 Id. at 566–67. 
 266 Id. at 567. 
 267 Id. 
 268 Id. 
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principles, the court found the defendant had satisfied the first 
prong, and therefore it rested its decision on a determination 
regarding the husband’s probability of prevailing on the merits of 
his claim.269  As for the state of the illegality exception, the 
criminality requirement imposed by Cabral and Mendoza was 
strengthened by the analysis put forward by the Intelligator 
court. 
iv.  Gerbosi v. Gaims, Weil, West & Epstein, LLP 
As illustrated in one of the most recently published 
California opinions on the illegality exception, Gerbosi v. Gaims, 
Weil, West, & Epstein, LLP,270 the criminality requirement has 
not only taken a firm hold of the illegality exception doctrine, but 
the ambiguities in its application are beginning to create 
uncertainty with other, previously well-established aspects of the 
doctrine.   
Gerbosi involved appeals from the denial of two anti-SLAPP 
special motions to strike from two separate, but related cases.271  
Both cases arose out of events either involving or having some 
direct or indirect relation to Anthony Pellicano, a private 
investigator who was indicted on conspiracy and wiretapping 
charges in 2006 by a federal grand jury.272  In one of the cases, 
Erin Finn sued the Gaims law firm alleging seven different 
causes of action: invasion of privacy; intentional infliction of 
emotional distress (IIED); unlawful eavesdropping; unfair 
competition; negligence; malicious prosecution; and abuse of 
process.273  Finn had previously dated one of Gaims’ clients 
(Robert Pfeifer), but following their separation, she became 
embroiled in litigation with him (both directly and as a witness to 
a separate litigation matter involving Pfeifer).274  Finn’s lawsuit 
arose from her claim that, after she and Pfeifer separated, 
Pfeifer, Gaims, and Pellicano “set out to destroy” her and used 
illegal wiretaps and harassing lawsuits to do so.275  Meanwhile, 
Michael Gerbosi, who was Finn’s next-door neighbor, also filed 
suit against Pfeifer, Gaims, and Pellicano (among others), 
 
 269 Id. 
 270 Gerbosi v. Gaims, Weil, West & Epstein, LLP, 122 Cal. Rptr. 3d 73 (Ct. App. 
2011). 
 271 Id. at 77. 
 272 Id. at 77–78. 
 273 Id. at 78. 
 274 Id. at 77. 
 275 Id. at 78. 
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alleging unlawful wiretapping, unlawful eavesdropping, invasion 
of privacy, and other similar claims.276 
Gaims filed a special motion to strike Finn’s claims first, 
then filed a special motion to strike Gerbosi’s claims a week 
later.277  Gaims’ argument for anti-SLAPP relief was similar for 
both motions: Gaims contended that the causes of action in each 
of the complaints arose from Gaims’ activity as counsel for Pfeifer 
in his litigation against Finn, and because neither Finn nor 
Gerbosi could show a likelihood of prevailing on their claims, the 
two complaints should be stricken.278  Both Finn and Gerbosi 
asked the trial court for leave to conduct discovery prior to 
opposing the motions, which the court granted.279  Thereafter, 
Finn and Gerbosi filed oppositions to the motions, and after 
argument the trial court denied both motions.280  Gaims appealed 
on each motion.281 
California’s Second Appellate District heard Gaims’ appeal.  
In rendering its opinion, the court first addressed, and quickly 
discarded, Gaims’ appeal of the motion to strike in the Gerbosi 
action.282  The court observed that, although Gaims held the 
status of a lawyer, the firm had not represented any client in 
connection with litigation involving Gerbosi.283  As such, the 
court reasoned, the claims of wiretapping and privacy invasion 
did not arise out of, and were not conducted in furtherance of, 
“protected ‘petitioning’ activity.”284  With that, the court affirmed 
the ruling denying Gaims’ motion as to Gerbosi strictly under a 
first prong analysis.285 
Finn’s complaint presented a more difficult analysis for the 
court because Finn and Gaims’ client had been involved in 
litigation with each other.286  In addressing Finn’s complaint, the 
court separated Finn’s claims into two groups: one for her 
invasion of privacy, eavesdropping, and unfair competition 
claims, and the second for the rest of her claims.287  With respect 
to the first group, the court held that Gaims was not entitled to 
anti-SLAPP relief because those causes of action are each “based 
 
 276 Id. 
 277 Id. at 78–79. 
 278 Id. 
 279 Id. at 79. 
 280 Id. 
 281 Id. 
 282 See id. at 80–81. 
 283 Id. 
 284 Id. at 81. 
 285 See id. 
 286 Id. 
 287 Id. at 81–82. 
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on alleged criminal activity.”288  In the court’s opinion, this group 
of claims was precluded because each of them was “predicated on 
violations of the Penal Code.”289 
One of the more confusing aspects of the court’s criminality 
conclusion is the fact that, of the three causes of action in this 
first group, only one appears based upon the Penal Code: 
unlawful eavesdropping (section 632 of the California Penal 
Code).290  The other two claims, invasion of privacy and unfair 
competition, are not claims governed by the Penal Code, but 
rather are claims arising from the California Constitution and 
the California Business and Professions Code, respectively.291  In 
any event, in light of its criminality conclusion and in reliance 
upon Flatley, the court concluded there was no need for a second 
prong analysis on these claims.292 
As for the second group of claims (IIED, negligence, 
malicious prosecution, and abuse of process), the court held them 
to be protected under the anti-SLAPP statute, and the court 
engaged in no illegality analysis as to these claims in reaching its 
result.293  In other words, although every one of Finn’s claims was 
based upon the same underlying actions by Gaims, the court held 
one group to be excluded due to illegality but the other to be 
protected under the anti-SLAPP statute.294  The court offered no 
other explanation for this distinction other than the conclusive 
statement that it “agree[d] with Gaims that the anti-SLAPP 
statute applie[d]” to the latter group of claims.295 
The court’s interpretation and application of Flatley to the 
first group of claims is worth particular attention here.  The 
court noted that it understood Flatley “to stand for” the 
proposition that “when a defendant’s assertedly protected 
activity may or may not be criminal activity, the defendant may 
invoke the anti-SLAPP statute unless the activity is criminal as 
a matter of law.”296  The Gerbosi court’s opinion goes on to assert 
that, in Flatley, “the [California] Supreme Court observed that an 
activity could be deemed criminal as a matter of law when a 
defendant concedes criminality, or the evidence conclusively 
 
 288 Id. at 81 (emphasis added). 
 289 Id. 
 290 Id. at 78. 
 291 Id. 
 292 Id. at 82. 
 293 Id. at 82–83. 
 294 Id.  
 295 Id. 
 296 Id. at 82 (emphasis added). 
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shows criminality.”297  Tellingly, the court chose not to quote, or 
even cite to, any portion of the Flatley or Paul opinions for this 
point. 
The Gerbosi court also opined on the burden shifting process 
in the face of the illegality exception, again invoking a 
questionable interpretation of Flatley.298  In a partial quote of the 
Flatley opinion, the Gerbosi court asserted that Flatley stands for 
the proposition that “a defendant’s ‘mere assertion that his or her 
underlying activity was constitutionally protected’ will not suffice 
to shift to the plaintiff the burden of showing that the defendant’s 
underlying activity was criminal, and not constitutionally 
protected.”299  Such a rule, Gerbosi adds—again partially quoting 
Flatley—would “eviscerate the first step of the two-step inquiry 
set forth in the anti-SLAPP statute.”300  In other words, under 
Gerbosi’s view, a claim of petitioning activity by the defendant 
does not shift any burden of proof to plaintiff to show criminality 
to fend off anti-SLAPP protection; a plaintiff need only allege 
defendant’s purported protected activities are criminal as a 
matter of law and the inquiry ends.301 
However, taking a closer look back at Flatley, the point it 
was making when it contemplated an evisceration of the first 
step was of a more subtle, although important, difference than 
the one which Gerbosi attributes to it.  Flatley’s entire statement, 
from which Gerbosi draws its partial quotation, provided:  
[I]t would eviscerate the first step of the two-step inquiry set forth in 
the statute if the defendant’s mere assertion that his underlying 
activity was constitutionally protected sufficed to shift the burden to 
the plaintiff to establish a probability of prevailing where it could be 
conclusively shown that the defendant’s underlying activity was illegal 
and not constitutionally protected.302 
Thus, Flatley cautioned us that an assertion of protected 
conduct, by itself, should not shift the burden to plaintiff to show 
a likelihood of success on the merits of its claims.303  Gerbosi 
misapplied this point, concluding that the assertion of protected 
conduct by a defendant should not, by itself, shift the burden to 
plaintiff to show illegality as a matter of law.304 
 
 297 Id. (emphasis added). 
 298 Id. 
 299 Id. (emphasis omitted) (emphasis added) (quoting Flatley v. Mauro, 139 P.3d 2, 13 
(Cal. 2006)). 
 300 Id. (quoting Flatley, 139 P.3d at 13).   
 301 Id. 
 302 Flatley, 139 P.3d at 13 (emphasis added). 
 303 Id. 
 304 Gerbosi, 122 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 82. 
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Indeed, on this point Gerbosi again fails to refer to the Paul 
opinion.  In fact, Gerbosi never once cites to Paul throughout its 
entire opinion.  Gerbosi even shies away from those portions of 
the Flatley opinion which discuss Paul on this point.  Had 
Gerbosi focused on Flatley’s thorough discussion of Paul, its 
position on burden shifting might be different.  Flatley, after all, 
quotes and endorses the portion of Paul’s opinion where it 
describes the burden of demonstrating illegality as falling on the 
plaintiff: 
[I]f the plaintiff contested the validity of the defendant’s exercise of 
protected rights “and unlike the case here, cannot demonstrate as a 
matter of law that the defendant’s acts do not fall under section 
425.16’s protection, then the claimed illegitimacy of the defendant’s 
acts is an issue which the plaintiff must raise and support in the 
context of the discharge of the plaintiff’s burden to provide a prima 
facie showing of the merits of the plaintiff’s case.305 
Recall, it was Paul’s reasoning that the Flatley court found 
persuasive and controlling in announcing its holding.  And, in the 
process of describing how the illegality exception should operate, 
it was Paul that described that establishing illegality was an 
“additional burden” held by plaintiff—a  
burden [that] should be met in the same manner the plaintiff meets 
the burden of demonstrating the merits of its causes of action: by 
showing the defendant’s purported constitutional defenses are not 
applicable to the case as a matter of law or by a prima facie showing of 
facts which, if accepted by the trier of fact, would negate such 
defenses.306   
Gerbosi’s refusal to shift this additional burden upon the 
plaintiff (and thus, allowing it to rest exclusively upon its 
allegations) marks a stark departure from the procedure 
envisioned by Paul and the other courts who subsequently 
adopted Paul’s vision.  This includes the California Supreme 
Court’s decisions in Flatley and Soukup (the latter of which noted 
that “a defendant who invokes the anti-SLAPP statute should 
not be required to bear the additional burden of demonstrating in 
the first instance that the filing and maintenance of the 
underlying action was not illegal as a matter of law,” and that “as 
part of the plaintiff’s burden of demonstrating illegality as a 
matter of law, the plaintiff must show the specific manner in 
 
 305 Flatley, 139 P.3d at 12 (quoting Paul for Council v. Hanyecz, 102 Cal. Rptr. 2d 
864, 871–72 (Ct. App. 2001)). 
 306 Paul, 102 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 872 (quoting Wilcox v. Superior Court, 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d 
446, 455 (Ct. App. 1994)). 
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which the statute or statutes were violated with reference to 
their elements”).307 
III.  THE PRESENT AND FUTURE OUTLOOK OF THE ANTI-SLAPP 
STATUTE’S ILLEGALITY EXCEPTION 
What started with a limited and fact-specific carve-out of the 
anti-SLAPP statute—molded in its infancy by cases like Paul, 
Kashian, and Flatley—has been simultaneously retracted and 
expanded into an amorphous and ambiguous doctrine operating 
far different than these initial cases intended.308  The discussion 
below considers the questions: how did the doctrine arrive at its 
current state and what impact will its changes have on future 
application of the doctrine? 
A. Where Does the Illegality Exception Stand Now and How 
Did It Get Here? 
In its early phases, Paul and Kashian set the stage for how 
the illegality exception would operate.  Paul was careful to note 
that the exception would have only very limited application; 
indeed, Paul emphasized the exception would only be applied in 
the rare instances of where a party concedes illegality as to its 
purported protected speech and/or activity, or where such 
illegality could be shown as a matter of law.309  Kashian, taking 
heart to this limited application, further noted that the requisite 
illegality was not something that could be established through 
mere allegations; illegality was an aspect of the exception that 
must be proven.310  And, as Paul and others added, the illegality 
requirement was an “additional” burden of proof carried by the 
plaintiff, above and beyond the plaintiff’s burden of proving a 
likelihood of success as part of the second prong analysis.311 
Flatley, and its companion case Soukup, endorsed and 
adopted the illegality exception.312  And, perhaps more 
importantly, the California Supreme Court endorsed the 
exception within the specific confines laid out in Paul (and to a 
lesser extent Davis and Kashian).313 
 
 307 Soukup v. Law Offices of Herbert Hafif, 139 P.3d 30, 47–48 (Cal. 2006).  
 308 See, e.g., Gerbosi, 122 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 82; Mendoza v. ADP Screening and 
Selection Servs., Inc., 107 Cal. Rptr. 3d 294, 303 (Ct. App. 2010); Cabral v. Martins, 99 
Cal. Rptr. 3d 394, 403 (Ct. App. 2009). 
 309 Paul, 102 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 871–72. 
 310 Kashian v. Harriman, 120 Cal. Rptr. 2d 576, 590 (Ct. App. 2002). 
 311 See, e.g., Soukup, 139 P.3d at 48; Kashian, 120 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 590; Paul, 102 Cal. 
Rptr. 2d at 871–72. 
 312 Soukup, 139 P.3d at 47; Flatley v. Mauro 139 P.3d 2, 13 (Cal. 2006). 
 313 Flatley, 139 P.3d at 13. 
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Moving forward to the illegality exception’s present 
application, however, the focus of the doctrine appears to have 
changed.  Illegality has become synonymous with criminality.  
Despite the fact that neither Paul, nor Davis, nor Kashian, nor 
Flatley, nor Soukup ever state that criminality is a requirement 
for applying the doctrine, subsequent cases such as Cabral, 
Mendoza, and Gerbosi all equate illegality with criminality.314  In 
fact, by the time the Second Appellate District decided Gerbosi, 
the illegality exception not only required that the underlying 
actions/speech be subject to the Penal Code, but that the 
actions/speech be punishable by either a misdemeanor or felony 
charge.315  Actions subject to other penalties under the Penal 
Code, such as sentence enhancements or civil penalties, no longer 
suffice to establish application of the illegality exception.  
Notably, the underlying actions in cases such as Paul and 
Soukup—and later Novartis—are not based upon and do not 
otherwise reference any Penal Code violations.   
Expanding the meaning of “illegality” is not the only 
development in the doctrine, as seen above.  The burden of proof 
has also evolved.  By way of Paul and Flatley, among other 
decisions, California courts had initially established that the 
plaintiff held the burden of proving illegality, either as a matter 
of law or by way of a concession by the defendant.316  Starting 
with Novartis and later Gerbosi, however, plaintiff’s burden 
appears far less than it once was, and perhaps may be gone 
altogether.  Notably, under Gerbosi, a plaintiff need only allege 
illegality (or, more accurately stated, criminality), to initiate the 
exception.317  Indeed, so long as the plaintiff at least alleges 
criminality (and so long as such allegation is punishable by 
felony or misdemeanor), the defendant appears foreclosed from 
any protection in the anti-SLAPP statute.318   
As such, under the latest California precedent applying the 
anti-SLAPP statute, a proactive plaintiff who anticipates an anti-
SLAPP challenge would be wise to specifically tailor his or her 
complaint in a manner that insulates the lawsuit from anti-
SLAPP challenge.  Such a plaintiff should allege that the 
 
 314 See Gerbosi v. Gaims, Weil, West & Epstein, LLP, 122 Cal. Rptr. 3d 73, 82 (Ct. 
App. 2011); Mendoza v. ADP Screening and Selection Servs., Inc., 107 Cal. Rptr. 3d 294, 
303 (Ct. App. 2010); Cabral v. Martins, 99 Cal. Rptr. 3d 394, 403 (Ct. App. 2009). 
 315 Mendoza, 107 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 303; Cabral, 99 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 403. 
 316 Flatley, 139 P.3d at 12; Paul, 102 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 871–72. 
 317 See Gerbosi, 122 Cal Rptr. 3d at 82 (“[A] defendant’s ‘mere assertion that his [or 
her] underlying activity was constitutionally protected’ will not suffice to shift to the 
plaintiff the burden of showing that the defendant’s underlying activity was criminal, and 
not constitutionally protected.” (quoting Flatley, 139 P.3d at 13)). 
 318 Mendoza, 107 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 303. 
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underlying speech and/or petitioning activities giving rise to the 
lawsuit are criminal.  So long as these allegations are made with 
particularity (ideally identifying the Penal Code section that 
would apply if pursued as a criminal matter), the lawsuit should 
be able to survive a special motion to strike challenge (assuming 
the court follows Gerbosi).  Ironically, in such a scenario, even if 
the lawsuit were a SLAPP, it would be permitted to continue as 
long as it meets these superficial pleading requirements.   
On the other hand, a defendant faced with such a complaint 
would be wise to characterize the claims as primarily based upon 
civil remedies (to the extent possible) and otherwise based upon 
actions which cannot be punished by misdemeanor or felony 
charges.  Such a defendant should also be prepared to carry the 
burden of proof on such characterization, but the defendant can 
take solace in the fact that success in characterizing the 
complaint in this fashion will advance the defendant to, at the 
very least, a second-prong determination forcing the plaintiff to 
show a likelihood of success on the merits.  The defendant in this 
scenario faces a steep uphill battle since a well-pled complaint is 
seemingly impossible to beat.  However, because so few civil 
claims are brought under the Penal Code, there may be room for 
maneuvering by defendants.  
So how did we arrive at such an inconsistent application of 
the illegality exception?  Much of the explanation for this lies in 
the Cabral, Mendoza, and Gerbosi courts’ overlooking of Paul (or 
their otherwise refusal to apply Paul).  In reaching its implied 
conclusion that the illegality exception required a showing that 
the questioned activity was inherently criminal or otherwise 
outside the scope of normal, routine legal services, the Cabral 
court claimed its facts were distinguishable from Paul (and 
Flatley for that matter).319  Cabral noted that, unlike Paul and 
Flatley, its facts did not involve inherent criminality.  Cabral 
appears to overlook the fact that Paul did not involve any 
allegations or proof that the defendant had violated any Penal 
Code section.320 
Mendoza, in following Cabral’s lead, not only incorporates 
new elements into the illegality exception analysis, it also 
appears to ignore Paul altogether.  Mendoza arrives at its 
conclusion (that the illegality exception did not apply in its case) 
because the purportedly illegal conduct was not criminal, and 
better yet, did not involve punishment by either misdemeanor or 
 
 319 Cabral, 99 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 403. 
 320 Paul, 102 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 867. 
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felony.321  Strangely, however, Mendoza carries out this analysis 
without ever once citing to the Paul opinion. 
Gerbosi continues the trend of ignoring Paul (and by 
extension Flatley, as it relied upon Paul).  Like Mendoza, Gerbosi 
never once cites to Paul throughout its opinion, despite Paul’s 
undeniable influence on the development of the illegality 
exception.322  Perhaps the Gerbosi court’s disregard for Paul was 
born out of the parties’ failure to rely upon or argue Paul during 
the appeal; a closer look at the briefs on appeal in Gerbosi reveal 
that neither the appellant nor the respondent ever cites to Paul 
throughout their briefing on appeal.323  Consequently, the 
Gerbosi court devotes no attention to Paul in its opinion, thus 
never relying upon Paul’s guidance regarding the scope of 
illegality’s meaning or the shifting of burdens among plaintiff 
and defendant throughout this process. 
In any event, the bottom line for future parties and courts 
addressing the illegality exception is one of uncertainty.  Some 
may follow Paul, Kashian, and Flatley’s reasoning in applying 
the early, California Supreme Court-endorsed version of the 
doctrine.  This group will utilize the illegality exception where a 
plaintiff has carried its burden of proof in establishing illegality 
by the defendant, either as a matter of law or as conceded by the 
defendant.  Conversely, others will follow Cabral, Mendoza, and 
Gerbosi.  This group will apply the exception where the plaintiff 
has merely alleged criminality by the defendant, but only where 
such criminality is shown to be punishable by misdemeanor or 
felony.  And, needless to say, future parties will face 
unpredictable (and likely contradictory) decisions as a result. 
B. How Do We Resolve These Uncertainties? 
i.  Legislative Amendment 
It is generally recognized that “[u]ncertainty undermines the 
rule of law.”324  As seen above, uncertainty regarding application 
of the illegality exception has already begun to undermine the 
principles which the state’s anti-SLAPP laws seek to protect; 
and, as such, the current state of contradiction and 
 
 321 Mendoza, 107 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 303. 
 322 See Paul, 102 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 868, 870. 
 323 See Appellants’ Opening Brief, Gerbosi v. Gaims, Weil, West & Epstein, LLP, 122 
Cal. Rptr. 3d 73 (Ct. App. 2011) (No. B219587), 2010 WL 1703225; Respondents’ Brief, 
Gerbosi v. Gaims, Weil, West & Epstein, LLP, 122 Cal. Rptr. 3d 73 (Ct. App. 2010) (No. 
B219587), 2010 WL 3022530; Appellants’ Reply Brief, Gerbosi v. Gaims, Weil, West & 
Epstein, LLP, 122 Cal. Rptr. 3d 73 (Ct. App. 2010) (No. B219587), 2010 WL 4155938.  
 324 Darryl K. Brown, Jury Nullification Within the Rule of Law, 81 MINN. L. REV. 
1149, 1160 (1997). 
Do Not Delete 1/31/2012 9:51 PM 
2012] Slapping Criminal Speech 579 
unpredictability must be addressed.  The most ideal manner for 
this will occur in the legislative setting.  Recall that the 
Legislature has previously addressed the illegality exception as it 
pertains to the SLAPPback statute.  More specifically, as part of 
enacting section 425.18, the Legislature enacted a provision 
specifically incorporating elements of the illegality exception to 
SLAPPback suits: “A special motion to strike may not be filed 
against a SLAPPback by a party whose filing or maintenance of 
the prior cause of action from which the SLAPPback arises was 
illegal as a matter of law.”325  In enacting this provision, the 
Legislature appears to have been influenced by Paul, as 
particularly evidenced by: (1) the timing of the enactment of 
section 425.18 (i.e., after Paul and before Flatley), and (2) the use 
of phrases such as “illegal” and “as a matter of law.”326 
Of course, given developments in the doctrine subsequent to 
Flatley, simply enacting legislation similar to that imposed in 
section 425.18(h) will be of little assistance.  In other words, 
codifying the principle that anti-SLAPP protection is unavailable 
to a party whose underlying actions were “illegal as a matter of 
law”327 would do nothing to cure the current inconsistencies 
regarding the questions of criminality and burden of proof.  
Future courts and litigants need guidance specifically targeted 
toward whether criminality is a prerequisite for the exception 
and who is to carry the burden of proof in determining whether 
the exception will be imposed.  Any meaningful legislative 
assistance must directly address these two issues.  If criminality 
is a requirement for illegality, the Legislature should specifically 
state as much as part of a modification to section 425.16.  And if 
so, the Legislature should also indicate what criminality means.  
Is the underlying action required to be subject to a provision of 
the Penal Code?  Does it mean that the underlying action must 
be punishable by a misdemeanor and/or felony?  Whether the 
Legislature endorses or rejects a criminality requirement, it 
should spell out what is required to avoid the current uncertainty 
that exists. 
Any legislative involvement also must address uncertainty 
regarding burden of proof.  Early case law on the illegality 
exception appeared to unequivocally place this burden on the 
plaintiff, but recent cases have shown a hesitation to engage in 
such burden shifting.  The Legislature should specifically set out 
who holds the burden in consideration of the exception, and what 
 
 325 CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.18(h) (West 2011). 
 326 Id. 
 327 Id. 
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level of proof needs to be meet (i.e., mere allegation or proof as a 
matter of law). 
Legislative involvement could go a long way to tighten the 
application of the illegality exception.  But, in order to have any 
meaningful impact, such legislative involvement must at a 
minimum address the issues outlined above. 
ii.  Clarification from the California Supreme Court  
Should the Legislature fail or otherwise choose not to enact 
legislation clarifying application of the illegality exception, the 
California Supreme Court will be the next-best source for 
returning consistency in this area of law.  Granting review of an 
appeal involving these issues will not only allow the opportunity 
to cure inconsistencies in the law and provide courts greater 
guidance on application of this doctrine, it would serve as a great 
opportunity to return the doctrine to the roots upon which it is 
based. 
As emphasized above, any examination by the supreme court 
should focus upon the reasoning employed by early cases 
invoking the exception, particularly Paul and Flatley.  In all 
likelihood, such a focus would render the Cabral and Gerbosi 
opinions a short life-span, at least to the extent they are read as 
holding criminality a prerequisite for the illegality exception. 
Paul and other early cases addressing the illegality 
exception began their analysis with focused consideration toward 
the underlying purpose and intent behind the anti-SLAPP 
statute.  As Paul observes, though the statute encourages the 
“continued participation in matters of public significance,” it is 
unlikely the Legislature intended to give defendants a means by 
which to protect themselves for their illegal activities.328  Thus, 
Paul concluded, “while it is technically true that laundering 
campaign contributions is an act in furtherance of the giving of 
such contributions, that is, in furtherance of an act of free speech, 
we reject the notion that section 425.16 exists to protect such 
illegal activity.”329 
Flatley also reminds us that the underlying purpose of 
section 425.16 is to prevent chilling of the “valid exercise” of free 
speech and petitioning rights.330  “As a necessary corollary to this 
statement, because not all speech or petition activity is 
 
 328 Paul, 102 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 869. 
 329 Id. at 871. 
 330 Flatley v. Mauro, 139 P.3d 2, 9 (Cal. 2006).  See also Soukup v. Law Offices of 
Herbert Hafif, 139 P.3d 30, 42 (Cal. 2006). 
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constitutionally protected, not all speech or petition activity is 
protected by section 425.16.”331  Certainly, the Legislature in 
adopting section 425.16 and by extension carving out a litigation 
protection against lawsuits arising from acts in furtherance of 
one’s “right of petition or free speech under the United States 
Constitution or California Constitution,”332 never intended to 
protect speech otherwise unprotected by the United States and 
California Constitutions.  This therefore begs the question: what 
type of speech do these constitutions refuse to protect? 
In Wilcox v. Superior Court, the Second Appellate District 
deliberated this very question in considering whether to apply 
the anti-SLAPP statute to a dispute between a group of certified 
court reporters and a separate alliance of reporters.333  The 
plaintiff/cross-defendants sought to strike the alliance’s cross-
complaint, and following the trial court’s denial of their motion to 
strike, the plaintiff/cross-complainant sought a writ of mandate 
challenging the trial court’s determination.334  The appellate 
court ordered the mandate be issued, based on a finding that the 
motion to strike should have been granted.335  
In the process of reaching its decision, the Wilcox court was 
faced with the question of what the anti-SLAPP statute “means 
by ‘furtherance’ of the defendant’s ‘right of petition or free 
speech.’”336  The court addressed this question by analogy.  If, for 
example, a defendant’s “act” in furtherance of its speech and 
petitioning rights was “a lawsuit against a developer,” the 
defendant would have a prima facie First Amendment defense 
(and thus the first prong of the anti-SLAPP analysis would be 
satisfied).337  If, however, “the defendant’s act was burning down 
the developer’s office as a political protest the defendant’s 
[special] motion to strike could be summarily denied without 
putting the developer to the burden of establishing the 
probability of success on the merits in a tort suit against the 
defendant.”338  In other words, in enacting the statute, the 
Legislature meant to protect acts such as the filing of lawsuits as 
a form of speech and petitioning activity, but did not want to 
protect destruction of property even though such actions are a 
form of speech. 
 
 331 Flatley, 139 P.3d at 331. 
 332 CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16(a) (West 2011). 
 333 Wilcox v. Superior Court, 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d 446, 448 (Ct. App. 1994). 
 334 Id. at 449. 
 335 Id. at 459. 
 336 Id. at 452 (quoting CIV. PROC. § 425.16(a)). 
 337 Id. 
 338 Id. at 452–53. 
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As Wilcox illustrates, we must draw a line between speech 
that is protected and speech that is not protected, and apply that 
line in the context of the anti-SLAPP statute’s illegality 
exception.  Where do we draw that line?  The most prudent 
source in answering this question would seem to lie in the well-
established precedent addressing First Amendment rights and 
particularly those cases deciding protected and unprotected 
speech.  Of course, a discussion examining the treatment of 
illegal speech and First Amendment protection would span 
volumes far beyond the confines of the instant article.  However, 
even a brief sampling of California and federal cases addressing 
this issue shows that the line between protected and unprotected 
speech deviates from the mere consideration of whether speech is 
criminal or not;  though, at the same time, it appears foolish to 
completely remove the consideration of criminality from this 
analysis. 
Indeed, the California Supreme Court has observed, “the 
goal of the First Amendment is to protect expression that 
engages in some fashion in public dialogue, that is, 
‘communication in which the participants seek to persuade, or 
are persuaded; communication which is about changing or 
maintaining beliefs, or taking or refusing to take action on the 
basis of one’s beliefs.’”339  But, as the court adds, “[a]s speech 
strays further from the values of persuasion, dialogue and free 
exchange of ideas, and moves toward willful threats to perform 
illegal acts, the state has greater latitude to regulate 
expression.”340  And, as we have seen, threats are but one area 
where the First Amendment has allowed restrictions on speech; 
other categories of restricted speech “include defamatory speech, 
fighting words, incitement to riot or imminent lawless action, 
obscenity and child pornography.”341  California courts, such as 
Larson v. City and County of San Francisco, have also added 
that, “[l]ike ordinary speech, commercial speech that is 
misleading, fraudulent, or concerns unlawful activity is not 
protected at all by the First Amendment.”342 
As this list of restricted categories of speech reveals, mere 
criminality is not the test for determining protection.  Indeed, the 
test for determining whether speech is protected is a difficult and 
fact-specific one, as the United States Supreme Court 
 
 339 In re M.S., 896 P.2d 1365, 1371 (Cal. 1995) (quoting Shackelford v. Shirley, 948 
F.2d 935, 938 (5th Cir. 1991)). 
 340 M.S., 896 P.2d at 1371. 
 341 Larson v. City & Cnty. of S.F., 123 Cal. Rptr. 3d 40, 57 (Ct. App. 2011). 
 342 Id. at 58 (emphasis added). 
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acknowledged in its recent decision, United States v. Stevens.343  
While the Court acknowledged that it “has often described 
historically unprotected categories of speech as being ‘of such 
slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be 
derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in 
order and morality,’” the determination is not one based on a 
simple cost-benefit analysis.344  The Stevens decision points to the 
child pornography scenario as a prime example.  There, the 
Supreme Court recognized a limitation on speech not only as a 
result of a cost-benefit analysis, but also in recognition that the 
speech in question was “‘intrinsically related’ to the underlying 
abuse, and was therefore ‘an integral part of the production of 
such materials, an activity illegal throughout the Nation.’”345 As 
the Supreme Court noted in New York v. Ferber, the child 
pornography case, “[i]t rarely has been suggested that the 
constitutional freedom for speech and press extends its immunity 
to speech or writing used as an integral part of conduct in 
violation of a valid criminal statute.”346 
Thus, we can conclude that speech can be restricted under 
the First Amendment where it is “an integral part of” a crime (i.e. 
extortion, as in Flatley), or where it is “misleading, fraudulent, or 
concerns unlawful activity” as noted in Larson.  Though the line 
does not appear drawn specifically at criminality, criminality 
certainly plays a substantial role in this analysis.  As such, to 
base application of the illegality exception solely upon criminality 
would circumscribe the exception more narrowly than the 
Legislature and the United States and California Constitutions 
appear to intend.  Perhaps the California Supreme Court, to the 
extent it decides to take on this issue, will use criminality as a 
guide-post in refining the illegality exception, and implement 
criminality more appropriately as a starting point than an end 
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